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# Societal Trends and Crime-relevant factors

An Overview for the Dutch National Threat Assessment  
on Organized Crime 2008 – 2012

*Dr. Peter Klerks  
Dr. Nicolien Kop*



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Organized Crime 2008 – 2012**

Dr. Peter Klerks  
Dr. Nicolien Kop

Police Academy of the Netherlands  
Lectorate for Crime Control  
& Investigative Science

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*Tu ne prévois les événements que lorsqu'ils sont déjà arrivés*

*Ionesco*

**DISCLAIMER**

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 The How and Why

The National Criminal Intelligence Service (Dienst Nationale Recherche Informatie) of the Dutch Police is preparing the second *Dutch National Threat Assessment on Organized Crime (Nationaal Dreigingsbeeld Criminaliteit met een georganiseerd karakter)* (NDB), which is to appear in 2008 and is directed at the period 2008-2012. Such a threat assessment is directed primarily at the phenomena of crime that could, now or in the near future, have a detrimental effect on the interests that need to be protected. These interests concern the freedom, safety, the state under the rule of law and the continuity of Dutch society.

Although the report you are now reading was originally drafted in the context of a Dutch strategic intelligence project, the authors came to believe – based on many reactions and requests- that a translation into English could be of interest to others outside the realm of Dutch law enforcement. While many of the examples and referenced sources are Dutch, the subjects and societal processes discussed carry some relevance for other Western societies. The overview of societal trends and developments as a whole may be useful as a reminder and checklist for other analysts, researchers and practitioners working in the field of (organized) crime and beyond.

The commission for the National Threat Assessment 2008 was drawn up as follows:

*Make an analysis of the current and future situation and the most significant vulnerabilities for Dutch society in relation to organized crime, with the intention of contributing to the establishment of priorities for policy for the strategy of the police and the justice department regarding these forms of crime at national and regional administration levels. Besides this contribution to the establishment of priorities for the strategy, the analysis should also provide information on this subject for the future on (other) issues that could be of*

*importance for the future in this regard (an observational function) and for which more detailed information needs to be collected<sup>1</sup>.*

The area of research of the NDB 2008 concerns the phenomena of organized crime that fit the following criteria: 1) structural collaboration between persons, 2) joint financial or material gain, and 3) serious consequences for society<sup>2</sup>. The topic “crime for ideological reasons” is not included in this area of research, and neither we will discuss the problems of local crime.

We have decided to assist researchers and analysts, in particular those who are involved in the research as part of the NDB, regarding the societal factors that may influence the nature, scope and seriousness of organized crime. A study has been conducted for this purpose into such “crime-relevant factors” (CRFs) that may have relevance for the period in question. The Lectorate of Crime Control and Investigative Science of the Police Academy of the Netherlands was commissioned to conduct this study. The objective of this study is formed as follows:

*The study intends to identify “crime-relevant factors”, which, in the context of the National Threat Assessment on Organized Crime 2008, could be relevant for the period 2008-2012, and may be used- as an annotated overview - by the Netherlands Police Agency and the regional police forces to substantiate predictions of the future.*

A crime-relevant factor has been defined in the first NDB, in 2004, as: “a societal factor that influences, or may have an influence on, criminal phenomena”. A CRF can be crime-generating or crime-inhibiting. CRFs can be relevant to one, several or all reaches of society and crime phenomena.

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<sup>1</sup> Projectvoorstel Nationaal dreigingsbeeld 2008 versie 2 (19 december 2006): 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Idem* 5

This study focuses on two research questions:

1. *Which crime-relevant factors can be inferred from relevant sources and which potentially important developments are occurring in connection with this?*
2. *Which new societal trends are developing that may become crime-relevant factors in the period 2008-2012?*

A guiding factor in this research for the identification of relevant factors and developments were the PESTEL dimensions (Political, Economic, Social, Technical, Environment and Legislative). These primary societal categories are used frequently when making predictions. In Dutch studies however, and also in this report, the Legislative dimension is often included in the “Political” and a new “Demographic” dimension is added, so the PESTEL acronym should really be PESTED (the Dutch refer to this as SEPTED). The possible relevance of specific developments were sought primarily in logical relations to aspects of crime, investigation and enforcement. We have directed our answers to these two research questions at the meso-level, i.e. we avoided both global generalities, and very specific details.

## **1.2 Making predictions**


Anyone with knowledge of the future has a great strategic advantage, whether it concerns military, economic or political affairs. Market analysts, trend watchers and intelligence services refer to the reduction of uncertainty about the future as a core business. In a society that is becoming increasingly focussed on the avoidance of risks, the reduction of uncertainty is highly valued. However, the future can only be empirically studied once it arrives, and at that moment, it is no longer the future. Although a lucrative “future industry” has emerged, research into the future cannot truly be treated as a science

in the strict sense of the word, due to the absence of data (De Wilde 2000; Sherden 1998).

So, are we doomed to complete ignorance concerning the future? Not at all. Certain developments follow certain tendencies in time that can be quite accurately calculated and extrapolated, such as the composition of the population. It is possible to make quite accurate statistical assessments of the current situation, birth rates and the average life expectancy, so that the prospective ageing of the population is not speculation but a phenomenon that almost certainly will occur. But even such predictable matters as the development of the population are influenced by numerous uncertainties. Immigration and emigration, for example, are much harder to predict, because these phenomena are in turn influenced by possible events and experiences of an economic, political, cultural and legal nature, etc. There may be a pandemic within the next few years, to which a great many victims may fall prey, particularly among the more vulnerable, elderly part of the population. On a happier note, it is expected that medical science will achieve unprecedented breakthroughs in cures for diseases that are currently fatal, such as heart and vascular diseases and cancer, in the next thirty years. These and other factors may cause the actual population pyramid twenty years from now to be quite different from the pyramid as it is predicted with certainty now.

Statements about the anticipated developments concerning organized crime phenomena cannot satisfactorily be exclusively based on trend analyses and empirical criminological research. Extrapolation of criminal trends on its own produces an image of which we can say, with the almost utmost certainty, that it will never become reality, because the influence of many factors that can only be predicted with difficulty has been ignored. (Bur-russ 2007). When studying future developments, the influence of factors relevant to crime must be taken into consideration as far as possible. This raises the questions:

which factors are relevant to crime? In what direction and to what degree will they be of influence? Because the NDB concentrates on a wide range of crime (i.e. everything that is organized) and specific crime categories are influenced by different things, this has produced an almost infinitely complicated combination of processes that influence each other. It would seem unadvisable to attempt to sum up this complicated combination in a model that is at all realistic or useful, and suitable for predicting organized crime in the broadest sense of the word, under the given conditions.



**Explanation of figure 1**  
 Crime no longer occurs as an isolated phenomenon. Societal developments and trends are, to a greater or lesser degree, of influence on three determining angles of crime phenomena: motivated and capable perpetrators, potential victims and absence of suitable guardianship, based on Clarke & Felson's Routine Activities Theory (1993)). Developments that have a major influence are called "Crime Relevant Factors". They influence potential perpetrators, potential victims and/or situations where (the absence of) guardianship is of such a nature that criminal phenomena occur more, less or otherwise than they have done previously. Consequently, this causes changes in the nature and degree of harm that the crime in question causes to society.

Figure 1

However, the formulation of a theory on organized crime has, over the past decades, produced many useful insights - for the Netherlands

too - that can, to a certain degree, provide a theoretical framework for describing, explaining and perhaps even predicting these forms of crime. Although the economic approach (crime is regarded as illegal entrepreneurship) has the greatest influence, researchers have also pointed out the importance of cultural, social-psychological and other explanatory models and the interaction between criminals and their opponents. (Spapens 2006; Van Duyne et al. 2006; Morselli 2005; SOCA 2006). By emphatically analysing criminal phenomena in a functional context (such as an ecosystem), structural processes can be brought to light (Felson 2006). For instance, it is clear that the production of, and trade in, narcotics can be described in the marketing terms of supply and demand, in which the behaviour of the market parties is influenced by such matters as the availability of the raw materials, the degree of repressive actions of the authorities and various socio-cultural trends such as music styles, individualization and employment. These and other societal developments with a considerable influence on crime are, as mentioned earlier, called crime-relevant factors (CRFs). The process of influence can be schematically sketched as described in the following.

### **1.3 Main trends, macrotrends and mesotrends**

An inventory of societal developments and trends must include some form of systematisation. The problem of systematisation is tackled in various ways in the literature on prediction. The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) bases its analyses on five main trends: the five “Is”: Individualization, Informalization, Internationalization, Informatization, Intensification (SCP 2004). The desk research for this research produced six generic main trends that exert influence on many developments, summed up briefly here. Wherever necessary, we have also included the specific counter-trends. As must be evident from this, a trend does not usually have an unambiguous nature or

effect but forms part of a force field. The main trends influence the macro trends via the PESTEL (or PESTED) dimensions, which can in turn be adapted to the mesotrends and the micro trends. These latter are the most specific for individual topics, in this case, the particular forms of organized crime. This approach, in which the element “Societal developments” from figure 1 is dissected in more detail, has been borrowed from a study of the future by TNO (The Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research) (De Korte et al. 2003). Viewed schematically, the systematics are as followed:




Figure 2: Coherence between trends, PESTEL and criminal phenomena

As a trend is adapted from a macro-level to a micro-level, it becomes more specific to the topic of organized crime, and consequently, its influence become more actual, and the easier it to see to what extent it really is a crime-relevant factor. Clearly, this depends both on the nature of the trend and on the criminal phenomenon.

This research does not intend to describe trends at micro-level,

because the exercise is better done at the analytical level of the regional police forces, or as a study of a specific area of crime. In the following chapters, the sub-sections at mesotrend levels are continually structured as described in the following: after a general explanation pertaining to the trend in question, which is concluded with the sources used to study that trend (documents, interviews and sessions), there will be a paragraph describing the possible connections to crime. While interpreting the mesotrend as a crime-relevant factor, we have based as much as possible on the possible effects on (potential) perpetrators, victims, guardianship or markets. We must state emphatically that these matters are not established facts but possibilities, of which the degree in which they will become real depends on the specific circumstances that need to be studied in more detail per crime category or per geographical area. We have left the final adaptation to the microtrend level to the researchers in their crime assessments or sub-studies.

### **1.3.1 Main trends**

Six generic main trends exert influence on many other trends<sup>3</sup>. We will start by describing these main trends here first.

#### ***Individualization***

The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (2004, 2006) and other authorities have advanced the theory that the individual is the basic unit of modern Dutch society. More-over, it is thought that the societal differences between people from different groups are growing smaller. The individualization trend originated in the sixties when the influence of the societal structure (expressed predominantly in the Dutch phenomenon “pillarization”) and the standards that it produced was greatly reduced. People become more individualistic and this has continued into all aspects of current society. During the

<sup>3</sup> *This section is based largely on De Korte et al. (2003).*

past five years, the tendency to further individualization seems to have levelled off and is tending towards stabilization.

Individualisation finds expression in an increased autonomy of individuals to structure their lives as they themselves see fit.

The influences on lifestyles from societal institutions such as government, family, church and (to a lesser degree) education and employers have diminished considerably. The consequences of this are the increased possibilities to set oneself up to be relatively independent of the societal environment. Unicity, authenticity and bespoke products have gained in value in relation to conformity and uniformity. However, this does not imply that the processes of conformation, such as taste and consumer patterns, and in relation to the labour market, have disappeared completely.

From the perspective of upholding standards and law enforcement, it is relevant that the “age of the individual” has produced over-assertive citizens who forcefully protect their own interests. In Dutch post-modern society, this can be recognised by the culture of “I do what I want” and the strong culture of tolerance, which matches the Dutch traditions of tolerance and negotiation that go back centuries.

Some counter-trends can be observed as a reaction to the more extreme forms of expression of the individualization trend, which includes the vulgarisation and “antisocial behaviour” of society. Influenced by growing feelings of insecurity and fear, privacy-limiting measures are felt to be justified, and the policy of tolerance is disputed.

### ***Flexibilisation***

In our modern society, dynamics and change have become the status quo. Oversight, hierarchy and structure have been replaced by what the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman calls a “liquid society” (Bauman 2006). Organizations are faced with growing complexity in the social environment and the economy. Customers and suppliers

demand bespoke products at the last moment, and this requires an increasingly flexible method of operation. Businesses outsource more and more activities and collaborate with other companies to introduce services and products to the market.

Various kinds of collaboration are starting to emerge, varying from mergers, through alliances, to virtual organisations.

### ***Technologization***

The great developments in technology over the past decades have had a pervasive influence that has on society. Lives and lifestyles are becoming more and more interwoven with technology. At the macro-level, all societal areas, such as economics, politics, culture and science have changed their appearance due to new technologies, but the most striking instance of these is the information revolution that surrounds ICT. Growing speed of movement and change is connected to this latter.

### ***Globalization***

As the means of communication and the large range of cheap means of transport, particularly cars and air travel become more widespread, geographical distances hardly form any kind of obstruction for contacts and collaboration between people from extremely divergent societies. This process of globalisation is particularly important for the economy, as capital and goods can be transported rapidly across the globe. Privatisation and market efficiency, stimulation programmes set up by governments and the unity of Europe all contribute to an open European economy. Globally, economies are becoming closer-knit: businesses operate transnationally more and more often, and manufacture is done in countries with the cheapest labour. People are also travelling for private reasons more easily, more frequently to exotic destinations, and international migration is increasing.

Counter-trends of globalisation are localization/regionalization

and alternative globalisation. Regionalization is expressed by the predilection for nostalgia and the past with a classic, old-fashioned, folklore or retro-style.

### ***Ageing***

The rise in the number of elderly people in the Dutch population has two causes: 1) the composition of the population: the substantial baby-boom generation will reach pensionable age within ten years. And 2) an increase of the average life expectancy: nowadays, pensioners do not only live longer than the elderly of a few generations ago, but they also remain healthy and active for longer. Their position in society has changed a great deal. The old-fashioned floral dresses are no longer popular: senior citizens remain active and participate as full citizens in society. This also has to do with the level of education that is, on average, higher than that of previous generations, enabling them to have a larger financial budget. Some senior citizens also remain active longer on the labour market.

### ***Dematerialization***

In the post-modern society, there is a change taking place among a section of the population: from a primarily material-oriented mentality to a need for greater meaning in life. Though this trend initially remained limited to a tendency to alternative lifestyles among a small and often highly educated population category, it has now penetrated popular women's magazines and management literature. Concerns about environmental issues have increased and are widespread, and are contributing to this trend too. There are numerous variations possible in the less materialistically oriented lifestyle, including the lifestyle that pays more attention to immaterial components such as relaxation, experiences, stories and perception, as well as nature, environment and animal welfare. On an entrepreneurial level, this main trend is expressed in socially responsible entrepreneurship; at a consumer level, the emphasis is

on awareness concerning consumption. More and more consumers are worried about the quality of products in relation to their health, such as food safety, and production methods. They place a lot of value on the observance of social, environmental and animal welfare standards in manufacturing processes. This main trend corresponds to the spirituality and feminisation of society.

### **1.3.2 Macrotrends**

Macrotrends are societal developments that have their effects on large portions of the population or branches of society. They are formulated as abstract concepts and can be divided into different mesotrends. Not all macrotrends and mesotrends that we found in the literature have been included in this study. We have limited ourselves to the trends, which, on the basis of criminological theories, empirical observations or plausible reasoning, can be assumed to have a significant relationship to phenomena of organized crime.

### **1.3.3 Mesotrends**

Mesotrends relate to changes that take place within (several) branches of society or are of importance for (several) specific population categories. In this research, mesotrends form the most concrete level of description.

### **1.3.4 Microtrends**

Microtrends, the most specific and detailed level, are not the subject of this research. The adaptation from mesotrend to the level of specific forms of crime is the task of the researchers, expressed in their contributions to the NDB.

## 1.4 Methods

A decisive factor for the design of this study was the fact that its set-up should be brief. There were three months available for its completion, which included the all the selection, study and processing of literature and documentation, preparation, organization, conducting and processing interviews and sessions with experts, and the analysis and report phases. As a result, the depth of the research, out of necessity, is limited to an exploration of the available literature and documentation, and a short series of talks with experts. Two sessions were organized for material experts from the Netherlands Police Agency (KLPD) as well. For similar reasons, CRFs relating to developments abroad could only be investigated as far as the necessary documentation was available at short notice.

Making explorations into the future is still very much in development as far as methodology is concerned. Characteristic of the most commonly used methods is that they are labour-intensive (such as the drawing up and testing of comprehensive models), reduce the complexity greatly (such as scenario analyses) or are still at the experimental stage (such as the weak signals approach (Uskali 2005), also applied by the Ministry of the and Kingdom Relations (BZK)). Ideally, an advanced model should be designed for the National Threat Assessment based on the extensive analysis of criminological theories, which could be used for a concentrated search for empirical data on which to base trend analyses and predictions<sup>4</sup>. As mentioned earlier, it is not realistic to think that such a bold work can be done within the definitions of the project (less than three hundred hours of work for research and reporting, because it would take years for any useable results became available<sup>5</sup>. Consequently, for practical

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4 *The Futures Wheel model, presented by Burruss (2007) is an interesting point of departure in this regard.*

5 *A risk model for fraud based on criminological theories with indicators was recently developed by a team of researchers as part of the Platform Fraude in beeld (2007), and another attempt was made to design a similar model for juvenile delinquency*

reasons we have examined the rapidly changing world from an implicitly theoretical framework. Within this framework, we studied organized crime particularly from market-oriented perspective, regarding greed, laziness and the avoidance of any suffering of the perpetrator's person as the most important forces for illegal actions<sup>6</sup>.. To put it briefly, at every perceived development, we asked: how can a creative and well-organized perpetrator make a profit from this? An important part of making predictions is the well-reasoned estimation of the degree of probability that a certain event of development actually will happen in the future (Ministry of Defence/DCDC 2007; Burruss 2007; van Wijck et al. 2007). We hoped, in this study, to make these estimations on the grounds of group discussions with colleagues from the Netherlands Police Agency, but unfortunately we did not succeed. We underestimated the amount of data provided, the diversity of the subjects and the complexity and realised that the probability of CRFs would not be attainable. This is partly because, in many cases, it can only be established at micro-level whether or not a development is actually crime relevant, and in which direction the effects will be felt. In the end, we had to limit ourselves to providing the potential impact on the perpetrator, victim or guardianship, the three composite parts of the “crime triangle”. This may not be regarded as “the final word”, but as an

*which is easier to survey. Professor Hans Boutellier from the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam and one of his staff have attempted to construct a model around the risk factors that influence on the emergence of criminal behaviour (information from the interview with Professor Boutellier, the Director of the Verwey-Jonker Institute; nothing has been published about the research yet). After studying the literature, they established approximately a hundred and fifty factors that have an effect. These include factors that are in the individual, the family, education and/or employment, leisure time and environment. Next, a number of factors were crossed of this rough list on the grounds of plausibility: lead in the food or drinking water may be a criminogenic factor, but seems to be less relevant nowadays. Consequently, around fifty factors remained, of which the indicators were determined. Approximately one hundred and fifty indicators were established, of which relevant data sources were found. In the end, around thirty risk factors remained, with an average of two indicators per risk factor. The research is being continued, so that proper correlations can provide policy priorities for decisions.*

6 For formal concepts and definitions, we used KLPD/DNR (s.a.).

aid to the researchers who eventually will have to investigate the microtrends.

Clearly, the available time and means have limited us, so that possibilities that could have led to new insights unfortunately have to remain unused. For instance, we would have liked to speak to young respondents, some of whom are already living in new worlds with their own standards and values. And we were able to interview only one representative of the special investigation department, but luckily the research report by the BOD platform *Fraude in Beeld* offers more insights. In addition, we read, and in particular we heard, many – quite surprising – things and the influx of new insights had not dried up by the end of the data collection stage. This reinforces our convictions that making predictions and conducting crime-effect-research for the police as part of the R&D function should really be an on-going occupation. By asking which crime could be related to relevant societal developments observed by means of a systematic scanning procedure and how probable that is, the police would be fulfil its observational and advisory tasks.

The knowledge product was created from explicit methodology and traceable sources. The overview of trends and CRFs is intended to be a helpful instrument that forms part of an intelligence process of permanent reflection and further development. This process brings forth strategic analytical products, designed to provide policymakers with useful information for decision-making.

#### **1.4.1 Desk research**

Regarding the Dutch literature and documentation, we mainly studied which crime-relevant factors can be deduced from up-to-date criminological studies of the previous three years, as well as the Crime Assessment 2005 by the National Crime Squad. The new WODC-monitor on serious and organized crime was not yet available when we concluded this research towards the end of March 2007.

As for the material from abroad, we initially paid the most attention to Europol's *Organized Crime Threat Assessment* (OCTA) and two explorations of the future by the *Futures Working Group*, situated at the FBI Academy. We also examined a scenario study by the Ministry of Justice (Van Wijck et al. 2007), a threat assessment by the British *Serious and Organised Crime Agency* (SOCA) and trend analyses and predictions by the German police, in particular those by the *Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen*, who distinguish themselves by their explicit methods. As the research got underway, dozens of sources were brought to our attention, partly through the aid of the Police Academy's Mediatheek and by pointers from people we interviewed. In the end, we used more than sixty sources for this study, which we have included in a survey at the back of this report.

#### **1.4.2 Interviews**

By agreement with the client, we drew up a list of twelve authorities and experts, divided over the various PESTEL (PESTED) dimensions. This produced eleven semistructured interviews on trends and crime-relevant factors; though continual attempts were made, we were unable to contact one of the businesses in the communications sector. The respondents gave us a substantial and valuable supplement to the documentation we had consulted. We have included a list of the authorities we interviewed in the back.

#### **1.4.3 Sessions**

We deemed it important to make the most advantage of the knowledge and insight available to us within the National Police Agency to determine the CRFs. We accordingly organized two sessions at the locations of the National Crime Squad and National Criminal Intelligence Department, to which we specifically invited experts on

this subject. The expectations that new developments would probably be put forward at these sessions, and that those present would be able to help add important matters to the survey of trends that we had at the time were partially met. However, we had to relinquish our initial intention to order all the contributed developments and trends systematically by importance and probability. We have, however, indicated which developments are regarded by many to be relevant. Incidentally, a few of the people present at the session for the National Crime Squad expressed fundamental criticism for the way in which the research had been set up. The criticism was directed mainly at the inductive nature of this study and at the inaccurate formulations of some of the trends, some of which were considered more plausible than others. Instead of “haphazardly” collecting possible trends, the critics thought it better to work from an explicit theory. In our defence, it can be said that this study does not in any way argue that describing specific criminal phenomena should be done without any theoretical foundations, as will become evident from this explanatory chapter and the literature references, though we have indeed aimed for the broadest possible orientation to be able to recognise what could be crime-relevant, without having a theoretical framework set up in advance that could limit this.

## **1.5 How to read this assessment**

Firstly, we must mention that this report, though it may be versatile and comprehensive, does not presume to be exhaustive. A report that has more than a hundred topics and is about the “whole world” will also miss the depth necessary to be directly applicable to specific criminal phenomena. This report is intended as an aid for researchers and analysts when describing the expectations regarding the developments of crime in the future. The researcher, using the CRFs that have been formulated at meso-level, can trace (more concretely

formulated) CRFs that form the foundations for expectations in relation to a specific criminal phenomenon. Accordingly, it is the responsibility of the researcher to extract those factors that can be used as support for a more concrete CRF from the presented overview and which can then be used to build the foundations of his or her own predictions for the future on his or her subject. It goes without saying that the researcher is free to build his or her foundations on factors other than the ones we shall assess here.

In addition, we must remark that it is unavoidable that some of the trends and developments described will overlap. We have not included any references to other sub-sections, as we only intend to call the attention to potentially relevant developments. However, we have included a list of definitions and key words. In the following chapter, we will discuss one complete PESTEL dimension. As mentioned before, Legislative is replaced by Demographic in this report. In each chapter, the macrotrends are explained in an introductory sub-section, followed by a number of more specifically formulated mesotrends. As stated earlier, to nearly every mesotrend we have added an appraisal of the way in which it may become a CRF. As the reader will notice, some mesotrends are only based on one source, or the respondents cannot agree on its importance or on the direction in which the effects may take place. Sometimes obvious counter-trends can be formulated, proving that the influence may be exerted in more ways than one. This does not mean to say that a trend that has only been mentioned by one or two people is not worth including in a more detailed (micro) analysis of the possible development of actual criminal phenomena. If analysts and researchers can argue that a trend can truly be regarded as a crime-relevant factor in the light of the discovered empirical evidence, and can explain it in more detail and refine it, it will facilitate the predictions for the next NDB.

One aspect that unfortunately can only be briefly discussed is the organization of the strategy for combating organized crime, and more specific matters such as the effectiveness and setting priorities in law

enforcement and prevention of crime. The systematic and correct “discounting” of the control factor when assessing developments in crime would require a separate study, for which we lacked the time. In addition, the enforcement policy as it is pursued, both on a national and a regional level, is subject to change and partly directed by politics, making it difficult to make predictions. Moreover, the warning reports such as the NDB themselves have an effect on the policy that is chosen, making an analysis even more complicated. However, there is no doubt that the “control factor” should have the explicit attention it deserves in every analysis of criminal phenomena. When the first National Threat Assessment was drawn up in 2004, the shortcomings in the surveillance and guardianship regimes of the police, the judiciary and other departments turned out to be extremely relevant for the nature, seriousness, scope and spread of organized crime. Shielding, evasive behaviour and avoiding risks appear to be important elements in the criminal strategy formulation, while on a tactical and operational level, the interaction between surveillance and investigation on the one hand and criminal entrepreneurs on the other is yet another decisive factor, as Spapens (2006) has proved in his dissertation on synthetic drugs. In analysis reports pertaining to such matters as cocaine trafficking, mobile banditry and West African networks, this interaction and the corresponding evasive behaviour has been observed, and several people we interviewed for this research pointed this out. The new WODC-monitor on organized crime (not yet published when this project was concluded in March 2007) discusses exhaustively the opportunity that certain professions offer for illegal profit, for instance, societal sectors such as the shipping industry (ports) and air travel (airports), but also things like the financial sector (interviews with AFM and the Dutch Social Intelligence and Investigation Service (SIOD)). The control on these professions falls far beyond the scope of the police and the judiciary. Some control is exercised in the private circles by private security services or through the disciplinary bodies.

Related to this latter theme is the fact that different sources and respondents, as well as colleagues from the National Police Agency, requested emphatic attention for the increasingly close-knit interests of the “underworld” and legitimate businesses. This phenomenon is hard to include in one of the categories of the PESTEL dimension, but is of evident importance in relation to organized crime and societal harm. It was repeatedly pointed out to us, during this research, as a result of that the way in which crime is perceived, there is still far too much focus on the visible phenomena<sup>7</sup>.

Finally, we would like to thank the respondents who were willing to give answers to awkward questions about the expectations in their field. And we are grateful to our colleagues from the National Police Agency, the National Criminal Intelligence Department and the National Crime Squad for their critical and constructive contributions to the exploration, especially to Frank Boerman en Martin Grapendaal, management assistant Halise Aydin and the staff of the Police Academy’s Printing and Photography Department for their perseverance and flexibility.

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<sup>7</sup> *One instance of a form of crime that sporadically receives attention but is both highly organized and lucrative, and presumably has many victims in the Netherlands, is the carroussel skam, in English works it is called the “Ponzi scheme” (interview with AFM; Roest 2006). As it is, organized horizontal fraud receives disproportionately little attention in investigations (Platform Bijzondere Opsporingsdiensten, 2007).*

## 2 Social-cultural macrotrends and mesotrends

Schematic overview of social-cultural macrotrends and mesotrends

1. **Growing cultural diversity** (Ch. 2.1)
  - 1.1 The rising supply of, and demand for, foreign products and services
  - 1.2 The growing importance of sub-cultures and group identities
2. **Society is experiencing a huge cultural revolution as a consequence of the information revolution** (Ch. 2.2)
  - 2.1 The rapid spread of new communications technologies
  - 2.2 Increasing sensitivity to media portrayals
  - 2.3 Growing importance of public information exchange via new media
  - 2.4 The emergence of a social divide: “the connected” and “the unconnected”
  - 2.5 Growing use of personal data in Internet traffic
3. **Mobility as a primary necessities of life** (Ch. 2.3)
  - 3.1 Increasing mobility
  - 3.2 Tourism expands
4. **Security as societal priority in a risk society** (Ch. 2.4)
  - 4.1 Intensification of guardianship and control
  - 4.2 The new meaning of respect
  - 4.3 Increasing vulnerability of the infrastructure
  - 4.4 The health industry is becoming an increasingly an open market Religion and ethics (Ch. 2.5)
5. **Changes in the social cohesion** (Ch. 2.6)
  - 5.1 More orientation towards religious values versus continuing “secularisation”
  - 5.2 Growing emphasis on values and standards
  - 5.3 Terrorism as a permanent priority
6. **Feminisation of society** (Ch. 2.7)
  - 6.1 Deterioration of social cohesion

### 2.1 Growing cultural diversity

The increase in the number of migrants in the Netherlands is creating greater cultural diversity. The status of the Netherlands as an immigrant country indicates a permanent influx of new arrivals, each bringing their own culture and traditions. Consequently, it may be expected that there will be an increasingly greater mix of lifestyles, eating customs and consumer patterns, with the established population acquiring the habits of the newcomers. On the other hand, as the second generation of “new Dutch” grows increasing larger, they will conform more easily to the consumer patterns of Western

society consumer than their elders. There is an ambiguous search for a creative combination for their own cultural heritage and symbolism and a desire to break free from it. (De Korte et al. 2003).

### **2.1.1 Rising supply of, and demand for, foreign products and services**

Both the demand for and supply of consumer goods have become particularly varied due to the multiculturalization of society. The demand for consumer goods from abroad – in particular those regions where Dutch migrants hail from originally – will increase even more. The trade is no longer exclusively among the own (ethnic or national) group. More and more Dutch people are travelling abroad for a time for their work or studies, and vice versa (Bakas 2006; SOCA 2006; interviews with SIOD, and the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW); Session with the DNRI).

This growing market does not only provide opportunities for legitimate entrepreneurs, but also for traders who operate illegally both in the Netherlands and in the countries of origin.

### **2.1.2 The growing importance of sub-cultures and group identities**

A growing cultural diversity does not only develop along ethnic lines, but also along local communities, at the level of style groups and internet communities, etc. Technologies such as the Internet and mobile telephony facilitate new social relations, as geographical proximity and physical meetings become less important. The widely differentiated selection in our consumer culture offers individuals the opportunity to distinguish themselves and to create their own lifestyles by buying certain goods or services. Such lifestyles also provide the opportunity for social identification and for group

formation. Certain groups have a great need for recognition and acknowledgement of the community identity that is particularly expressed on special occasions, events and the like. There are also surprising combinations of traditions and new possibilities emerging, such as “digitally capable and independent women in burkas”. The contrasts between (ethnic, political and sub-cultural) groups are growing larger, which is having its effect on mentality and actions, and may, for them, justify the use of violence. (Bakas 2006; Klapwijk & Van Rij 2005; Ministry of Defence/DCDC 2007; Interviews with the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), the SIOD, and the Verwey-Jonker Institute).

This diversity may cause the “older forms” of crime (such as trade in certain narcotics) to be revived, while local and sub-cultural communities form deviant opportunity structures that provide a certain degree of shielding and make it easier for accomplices to be admitted. Such sub-cultures can affect the values and standards of potential perpetrators (differential association), but may also increase the self-confidence and self-defence of potential victims.

## **2.2 Society is experiencing a cultural revolution as a consequence of the information revolution**

Our society is changing drastically due to the rapid emergence of digital technology for storing and distributing information. The information revolution is changing the way we work, live, learn and spend our leisure time (Infodrome). It has been called the emergence of the e-culture, and means that the transfer of knowledge and the way it is done will change dramatically. The new virtual world of today, which supplements our physical reality, is called “cyberspace”. People are moving more and more frequently between the virtual and physical worlds. This new behaviour is contributing to the changes to modern life: we can become informed via new ways

and we can communicate in new ways (De Korte et al. 2003; Dexter 2006; Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen 2006; interview with the AIVD).

### **2.2.1 Rapid spread of new communication technologies**

New public telecommunication technologies are launched quickly and spread quickly, such as illustrated by Internet telephony (Voice over IP), Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN), new forms of mobile (broadband) telephony and mobile PDAs.

Advanced forms of telecommunication can facilitate crime, certainly when use is made of powerful encryptions, because criminals can operate faster and shield themselves better. On the other hand, however, it also offers new chances for investigation when signals can be intercepted or traced, so we can regard it as both a stimulating and an inhibiting factor.

### **2.2.2 Increasing sensitivity to media portrayals**

Within the media, issues of integrity are the order of the day. More and more frequently, the question is raised whether the media are guilty of “demonising” persons or creating a hype. In any case, they are certainly partly responsible for the effects of the public image. For both organisations and persons, it is becoming more important to deal correctly and decisively with such dilemmas. Businesses have a large interest in avoiding the risk of damaging their image, since this could make the vulnerability of vital business processes visible, or produce other damage. It can be caused by spreading disinformation. The developments in media and telecommunications form the foundations for the rapid emergence of an electronic audiovisual culture. Our culture is becoming increasingly controlled by signs, symbols and images. The communication of information via visual images is much faster and the impact of images is much more

immediate. The more images replace the text, the more important and variegated information may be lost. (Römgens 2002; session with the DNRI).

By means of penetrating images and paying (too) much attention to sensational aspects, and the media have increasing influence on the interpretation of incidents and consequently have much influence on the policy. The effects of this include influence on the feelings of insecurity and contribute to the creation of undesirable role models. In the event that persons, companies and authorities consciously communicate incorrect images for their own (image) interests, it will serve to break down the reliability of public information, which stimulates mutual distrust in the public traffic.

### **2.2.3 Growing importance of public information exchange via new media**

On the Internet and off, news groups, web logs, chat boxes and other channels form a new, and to a large extent, unstructured expansion of the information web. Through these new channels and through tip lines, manipulated information can also be anonymously brought into circulation, while the truth of its contents is difficult to check (Boerman & Mooij 2006).

Criminal links can supply disinformation to shield their own activities or to obstruct the investigation and legal actions. This latter can be done by direct imputations, but also by influencing the image portrayal and opinions regarding illegal phenomena and perpetrator groups, with the possible consequences of affecting policy pertaining to criminal law.

#### **2.2.4 The emergence of a social divide: "the connected" and "the uncon-nected"**

In our society and economy, it is becoming increasingly important to have an understanding of, and to be capable of using, information (technology). Various studies have shown that the spread of ICT is accompanied by a growing inequality among the population, on an international and national level. The current developments have led to that fact that a group of poorly educated people, the not-so-wealthy and otherwise deprived people have more and more difficulty in keeping up with the information society and knowledge economy. The divide in society between those who have access to knowledge and those who are less capable of this is often called the "digital divide". Informatization and automation reinforce the established relations and this digital divide follows the existing cracks and rifts in our society (Römgens 2002; Session with the DNRI).

Computer illiterates, including some senior citizens, are relatively vulnerable to fraud in this information society. On the other hand, both wiz kids and potential perpetrators have a huge edge on potential victims and even partially on the guardians and enforcers.

#### **2.2.5 Increasing use of personal data in Internet traffic**

The more intensively the Internet is used for commercial activities and formal contacts between citizens and the government, the more the importance of scrupulousness and reliability of the used identity data becomes. This makes the manipulation of such data for illegal use more lucrative. This can be done by phishing (eliciting confidential data by means of digitally spying on Internet users) and vishing (the manipulation of telephone traffic, for instance by forging, in a way that is almost impossible to trace, a "reliable" phone number via Voice over IP) (Boerman & Mooij 2006; <http://en.wikipedia.org/>

wiki/Vishing; interviews with the AIVD and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations; Session with the DNRI).

Whether this phenomenon will grow to be such scope in the coming years that we can speak of serious consequences for society depends on the alternatives that are left for frauds. For instance, to what extent will developing countries be misused for financial transactions instead of the Netherlands? This will also affect the ease with which profits can be made on the Internet, for instance by using botnets for other forms of crime, such as click fraud or spamming. Furthermore, the fact that more and more financial transactions are done from individuals' private PCs or from cell phones will increase the vulnerability for fraud. This could lead to more street violence as a means of obtaining access codes, etc.

## **2.3 Mobility as a primary necessity of life**

In the economy, travelling from place to place and moving is becoming a deeply rooted human necessity that fulfils both a personal and economic value. Mobility for private use in particular (by car, by aeroplane and by public transport) has increased greatly during the past years. The mass mobility is often explained by three developments: the growth of the population, the increase in prosperity and the expansion of the road networks (De Korte et al. 2003; Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen 2006).

### **2.3.1 Increasing mobility**

Mobility has grown explosively over the past decades. The amount of time that people spend travelling from one place to the next and on holiday travel has risen steeply over the years. The Dutch have started to travel more often, for longer periods of time, over longer distances while more people are arriving in the Netherlands

from abroad. The number of Dutch who are descendents of another nationality is growing. These ethnic groups will travel increasingly often to visit their relatives and friends. At the same time, the question arises as to whether this higher number of journeys is actually a new trend, or more the same. (Session with the DNRI).

An increase in international traffic implies that part of it is done with illegal intentions, and the more the size of this flow of people and goods grows, the greater the pressure will become for the surveillance authorities, so that effective surveillance will become more difficult and more expensive.

An example of this is the mobile banditry. Entrepreneurs and trade organizations are suffering greatly from travelling groups of perpetrators, who also carry out organized raids on shops and cargo theft. But private individuals also experience trouble from these kinds of groups, due to burglaries in homes and thefts from cars and of outboard engines. In the neighbouring countries such as Germany and Belgium, this type of banditry has been given high-priority status by the investigative authorities, but this far less the case in the Netherlands. In 2004, the Belgian Judicial Police estimated that one in five thefts were committed by Eastern European perpetrators. Break-ins committed by roaming groups of perpetrators have since then been included as a priority in the National Security Plan. After extensive police action, the groups of perpetrators proved to be extremely daring in developing their counter-strategies. From Belgium, there have been repeated complaints about the lack of cooperation from the Dutch authorities, for combating crime against transport entrepreneurs in particular. In the Netherlands, the trade organization, the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW), has spent a great deal of effort into getting mobile banditry onto the government agenda, and accordingly, a pilot was to start in 2007 to “put an end” to this form of crime. (Gunther Moor & Johannink 2006; Kuppens et al. 2006; Van der Laan & Weenink 2005; De Raedt & Moulin 2005; Dupuis 2004;

interview with the VNO-NCW; Various news bulletins found on Google searches for “roaming groups of perpetrators”).

### **2.3.2 Tourism expands**

The tourist industry is expanding: “distant countries are becoming closer”. And tourism to exotic places is becoming feasible for more and more people. Within the Netherlands, the nature of tourism is changing: there are more groups of Asians, who have completely different preferences to Europeans and Americans and a non-individual mentality. One of the consequences of this will be an upgrade and expansion of the established China towns and the stimulus for Chinese companies to settle in the Netherlands (Bakas 2006; Interviews with the University of Wageningen and The Dutch Association of Insurers; Session with the DNRI).

The increased in-coming and out-going tourism has adverse side effects, such as the trade in women, human trafficking and (child) sex tourism. In addition, Dutch citizens of over fifty are seen as easy targets for theft abroad.

## **2.4 Security as a societal priority in a risk society**

In the prosperous state of the Netherlands, there has been growing uneasiness about the term “security” over the past years. The subject is high on the list of societal priorities. The assurance of security has been one of the primary tasks of the state for centuries; in particular, the state is supposed to protect its population against threats from inside the country and from abroad. The terrorist attacks on the United States and other countries prove how difficult that is. The sensitivity to risks in modern society has risen. We live in a risk society where the risks are shared, instead of personal and controllable. This increases the feeling of uneasiness and the yearning for safety. At the

same time, we have to acknowledge that security as a political topic seems to have been pushed to the background in 2007. There is also more attention paid to prevention again, besides repression (De Korte et al. 2003; interviews with the Ministry of Justice and the AIVD).

#### **2.4.1 Intensification of guardianship and surveillance**

The fear of becoming a victim of crime is widespread: approximately a quarter of the Dutch population feels insecure at one time or another. The majority of the population regards crime as one of the greatest societal problems. Over the years, the general feelings of insecurity have grown. The media has a detrimental role in this due to its sensational news coverage. Partly as a consequence of the globalisation and the increasing mobility of people and goods, the fear of rapidly spreading diseases, such as the bird flu in animals and SARS in people has risen. The same can be said of computer viruses, which – because of the Internet's open nature – can spread rapidly, causing considerable damage.

The fear of crime and other threats causes people to seek protection from the government in the form of more intensive surveillance on potentially suspect behaviour. In this regard, less importance is attached to the protection of privacy than previously. On the one hand, the world has become more transparent: we can see satellite pictures of practically every spot on earth, while on the other, we ourselves are continually being watched. Legislation and measures to limit our privacy are being justified. Polls held in the Netherlands and other West-European countries indicate that many citizens are prepared to give up their citizen's rights if that will avert terrorist threats. Now it has emerged that certain authorities – the American government for instance – are capable of limiting this transparency, to decide when and how people are given certain information. Besides, governments have almost complete access to personal details, both in the public and private domains, though there is virtually no judicial check on

it any more.

The call for more surveillance and limitation of liberties of individuals in public spaces remains loud. The government is expected to guarantee our safety. By contrast, this increasing government control is finding resistance: citizens are starting to feel patronized and limited in their actions. (Security) cameras are increasingly becoming part of our daily life. The number of CCTV systems in public spaces is rising steeply, and the technology for the automated analysis of camera images of suspicious acts or persons is developing rapidly. Some studies predict the emergence of protective communities within restricted territories in the mid-term. (SCP 2004; *Politie-monitor*; Boutellier et al. 2005; Vedder et al. 2007; interviews with Rathenau Institute, The Dutch Association of Insurers, the AIVD and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations).

The growing fear of crime can be converted into more drastic measures, and therefore, guardianship and investigation may be reinforced. It is possible that this will call a halt to the development of crime. Nevertheless, mistrust will arise if surveillance by the government and private authorities goes too far.

#### **2.4.2 The new meaning of respect**

The traditional meaning of respect is: “accept the other person for what he or she is”. But a new meaning is emerging fast: “know who is the strongest”. This version originated in the United States and is transmitted to the young in particular, via music and films. Meaningless violence often goes hand in hand with this new form of “respect”, which could be an indication of the way in which society is changing. “Respect” in the European tradition is related to propriety, courtesy and modesty; obligingness is perhaps the most telling definition. People must be willing to give the other person his or her space. This form of respect results in pleasant manners.

The “respect” that has come over here from America has more to do with power. It is linked to the world of gangs and is part of the violent atmosphere. It is an attitude that says: “Well, what about it? Don’t you dare attack me, don’t you dare criticize me, don’t judge me by my achievements”. This form of respect is demanded, not commanded.

Individualisation and assertiveness that have gone too far may lead to antisocial and unlawful behaviour and may also be a reason for, and have an effect on, participation in criminal societies. Border-crossing behaviour may be expressed in more frequent and a further-reaching use of violence

### **2.4.3 Increasing vulnerability of the infrastructure**

The vulnerability of society and especially of the critical infrastructure is growing. In the event of a power failure, or if the communication infrastructure and/or major transport channels should drop out for several days, there would be disastrous consequences. We regard as critical infrastructure such things as: telecommunications, the power supply, the financial sector and the insurance branch; transport and traffic; healthcare; the emergency services; fully operational governmental, guardianship authorities and supervisory bodies (Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen 2006; interview with the Dutch Association of Insurers).

A further increase of the vulnerability and publicizing certain aspects of it may offer potential perpetrators the opportunity for blackmail or extortion or obstructing guardianship.

### **2.4.4 The healthcare industry is becoming an increasingly open market**

The privatisation of the healthcare industry has led to competition and the loss of established positions. The market is regrouping, and

foreign influences will have more impact. In countries such as India, but also in some European states, illegally copied pharmaceuticals are manufactured and sold in parties at minimum prices. One of the manifestations of this is that the sales of uncertified medications such as health tests and pharmaceuticals such as medicines, growth hormones, stimulants, aphrodisiacs and the like via the Internet can evade government control. This market offers opportunities to illegal entrepreneurs. Added to which, according to the experts, the risk that extremely contagious, serious diseases (pandemics) will spread globally is greater than ever. Effective medicines against these are not sufficiently available, which offers marketing opportunities to entrepreneurs who have no scruples. (GAO 2007; Klapwijk & Van Rij 2005; Ministry of Defence/DCDC 2007; interview with the Rathenau Institute).

The growing opportunities for illegal trade in medicines and stimulants are a stimulating factor for organized crime. Well-known narcotics dealers who previously dealt in cannabis, synthetic drugs and heroin have added illegal pharmaceuticals, for which there is a lower threat of penalty, to their assortment.

## **2.5 Religions and ethics**

The orientation on religious values and on political values and standards are becoming more defined. It is marked by a counter-trend: the general role of religion is becoming less important (secularisation). A divide can be observed between secularism and orthodox religion (McFaul 2006; interviews with the Verwey-Jonker Institute, and the AIVD).

### **2.5.1 More orientation towards religious values versus continuing “seculari-sation”**

On the one hand, a growing predilection for meaning and sense of value can be observed, partly due to the unbridled consumerism and “meaningless violence”. In the Netherlands, there has been growing interest in “New Age” movements since the seventies. The return of the Christian mentality to politics, of which the Balkenende IV cabinet is a prime example, illustrates another version of the ideological revival and actual influence of it on politics and society. Besides these developments, the arrival of new communities in the Netherlands has given superstition and magical beliefs new impulses. The increasing scope and intensity of fundamentalism, mainly among Muslims, may lead to aversions to and resistance against materialism and Western values and standards. In the meantime, “*Entzauberung der Welt*” has been going on for a long time now. The dominant rationalist paradigm based on science remains the most dominant influence of politics and culture. (Ministry of Defence/DCDC 2007; Groen and Kranenberg 2006; interviews with the Verwey-Jonker Institute and the AIVD).

A religious (re-) orientation may have a restrictive effect on potential perpetrators, but if it involves fundamentalism, respect for Western values and the corresponding willingness to uphold the law may be undermined. In politics, a re-evaluation of (strict) values may have stimulating impact on the factor guardianship where it concerns available budgets, the scope of a policy, etc.

### **2.5.2 Growing emphasis on values and standards**

Over the last decade, many people in the Netherlands have become convinced of the need to re-acquaint themselves with values and standards. However, there is still dis-agreement as to which values and standards have sufficient general applicability to be maintained

in social traffic and to be reinforced by government policy. (De Beer & Schuyt (ed.) 2004).

A re-evaluation of (strict) values may have stimulating impact on the factor guardianship where it concerns available budgets, the scope of a policy, etc.

### **2.5.3 Terrorism as a permanent priority**

Terrorism will only be discussed in this study in as far as it has an effect on organized crime. Attacks in the United States and several European countries, and numerous foiled complots have placed terrorism as a problem and a threat high on the political agenda. Measures against terrorism can also influence organized crime in various ways. (Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen 2006).

More stringent surveillance programmes and the monitoring (potential) groups of perpetrators will interfere with illegal operations, and this applies to operations produced by organized crime too. Accordingly, the persistently large attention paid to terrorism has a restrictive effect on organized crime.

## **2.6 Changes in the social cohesion**

Several people we interviewed have noticed that there have been substantial changes in the social cohesion of Dutch society. They found there was a trend afoot during the past five years that tended towards the necessity for group identification, although the social distance *between* groups is growing.

### **2.6.1 Deterioration of social cohesion**

Due to the fragmentation of traditional social connections such as family, religious communities, sport and hobby clubs and

neighbourhoods, a lack of social cohesion is emerging. The increased labour participation, in relation to the longer working hours and the merging of work and leisure time, as well as the intensive use of the Internet will contribute to the loss of social cohesion in the traditional sense, although partially new, mainly virtual contacts may replace them. Surveys indicate that the Dutch feel the need to belong, but allow little time to invest in this feeling. (Klapwijk & Van Rij 2005; interviews with SIOD, the AIVD; session with DNRI).

A deterioration of social cohesion will have a detrimental influence on such matters as feelings of security (people in an environment they know socially feel safer) and the mutual social control (an aspect of social cohesion). Consequently, there is less informal guardianship from citizens, and potential perpetrators will experience fewer restrictive social connections. The self-confidence and self-defence of potential victims is related to social cohesion.

## **2.7 Feminisation of society**

There is a mounting influence of typically female values on life in western societies; there is more emphasis on care and attention, intuition and creativity. Examples of this can be found in various areas. The image of the ideal modern man is also changing: he must be strong and tough, but tender and caring too (androgynous). Communication skills are becoming more important in modern society. And it is remarkable that girls are currently doing better at school than boys are. It has been suggested that the western world is feminising, while the rest of the world remains dominated by a masculine orientation. These differences in value orientation could eventually lead to open hostility. (Groen en Kranenberg 2006; Leistra 2006; Ministry of Defence/DCDC 2007; interviews with the AIVD and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations).

Young women, more than before, are engaged in radically political and fundamental networks, and in organized crime.



# 3 Economic macrotrends and mesotrends

Schematic overview of economic macrotrends and mesotrends

1. ***Prosperity is rising*** (Ch3.1)
  - 1.1 The difference between rich and poor are growing
  - 1.2 More time for leisure
  - 1.3 Growth of obscure and fraudulent investment constructions
  - 1.4 Easy access for jobseekers with problems concerning their residence status
2. ***Unemployment*** (H3.2)
  - 2.1 The risk of large-scale unemployment
  - 2.2 Unemployment among underprivileged groups
3. ***Globalisation*** (H3.3)
  - The increase in traffic of people and goods, services, money and information
  - 3.2 The EU continues to expand
  - 3.3 The emergence of new economic giants such as China, India and Brazil
  - 3.4 More spending power in new EU member states and former developing countries
  - 3.5 Failed states as places of political and criminal freedom
4. ***Economic up-scaling and concentrations of powers*** (H3.4)
  - 4.1 A shift in the balance of power between companies and the national government
  - 4.2 Hedge funds are becoming more active
5. ***The emergence of the network economy*** (H3.5)
  - 5.1 Economic deprivation due to deterioration of research & development
  - 5.2 Knowledge as economically desirable commodity
  - 5.3 Informal contacts are becoming more significant
  - 5.4 Businesses are forced to respond to individualization
  - 5.5 Interrelations between the "underworld" and legitimate businesses
6. ***Growing importance of socially responsible entrepreneurship*** (H3.6)
  - 6.1 Growing demand for integrity within companies

## 3.1 Prosperity is rising

A rise in spending power and an improvement of living conditions is expected to occur in the Netherlands during the next four years. Not everyone will be able to benefit from this equally.

### 3.1.1 The differences between rich and poor are growing

The differences between the rich and the poor in the Netherlands have grown in recent years. There is a lot of criticism on the size of

the highest incomes (“money-grabbing culture”) but as yet, there is no real policy has been drawn up on this topic. (*Platform Fraude in beeld* 2007; interviews with the Ministry of Justice and the Dutch Association of Insurers).

Striking differences in prosperity may stimulate potential perpetrators (relative deprivation, neutralization theory), while wealthy persons and their property make attractive targets. This makes it plausible to mark large differences in prosperity as a CRF. The precise relation between the short-term economic climate, the distribution of wealth and the nature and scope of organized crime in the Netherlands has not yet been thoroughly investigated and so far, no statistical relations have been established.

### **3.1.2 More time for leisure**

Due to a combination of factors (more prosperity, a warmer climate, ageing, integration, crowd evasion), there is a noticeable rise in the domestic leisure sector. Luxury towns are being built (the “Blauwe Stad” near Winschoten is one, Wieringen, the islands of Zeeland) where residence and leisure pursuits are combined. There is a demand for luxury homes in areas reserved for green belts. The recreational water sports branch and active outdoor leisure pursuits are more popular than ever. The new Dutch are also becoming involved in these past-times, for instance in the parks of the large cities, recreation areas and allotments. (interview with the University of Wageningen).

Remote living in luxury will certainly involve the risk of becoming a victim of break-ins, robbery, etc. People behave more outspokenly in their free time and test their limits, which could lead to clashes, consequently increasing the prospects of crime. There is also so much money from illegal activities in the leisure industry that we may refer to opportunity structures.

### **3.1.3 The rise of obscure and fraudulent investment constructions**

More and more people who have extra money due to the surplus value on their houses or other means are looking for profitable opportunities to have their capital grow faster than in a savings account at a bank. There is little margin to be made for traditional financial institutes when the interest rates are low.

Many providers of partially questionable investment structures are responding to this situation with non-existent real estate and suspect investment funds, etc. Regularly, it turns out that money-laundering operations were shielded by these constructions. In the complicated world of financial services, it is difficult for those who do not the field to distinguish the legitimate providers from the questionable ones. People who have untaxed money are at the risk of becoming victims of fraud carried out by organizers of pyramid scams or Ponzi schemes. Ethnic groups have their own circuits where the trust of inexperienced small investors is betrayed via underhanded constructions and “profitable” loans. The control on these and similar practices is lacking. Huge amounts of money are involved; often it turns out that the charismatic fraudsters and their staff have been thinking up new tricks for decades with only a small risk of criminal prosecution. (Roest 2006; interview with AFM).

### **3.1.4 Easy access for jobseekers with problems concerning their residence status**

Our prosperous Dutch society, which has a great demand for cheap labour in the service industry, rebuilding and construction work, work in the catering industry, etc. is very attractive to people without documents. Insufficient or absent surveillance on the open European inner borders does not pose any obstructions. (Session with the DNRI).

A substantial number of aliens who are illegally residing here are involved in crime, including in organized connections.

## **3.2 Unemployment**

Large-scale unemployment is one of the most significant factors pertaining to social stability. (Bonger 1911).

### **3.2.1 The risk of large-scale unemployment**

The chances of large-scale unemployment in the coming years, especially in the lower regions of the employment market, will depend greatly on the Netherlands' competitiveness in comparison with other countries and on the general economic climate. The European economy seems to be stable, but the indicators in the United States are far less ideal. A recession in the United States would affect European prosperity and employment considerably.

Large-scale unemployment often causes social unrest. The unemployed are susceptible to criminal temptation, partly because of the drop in social connections and disposable income.

### **3.2.2 Unemployment among underprivileged groups**

Certain portions of the population have disproportionately high unemployment figures, due to such things as inadequate education, discrimination on the labour market, age and deviant work ethic. The position of established underprivileged groups may deteriorate because of the influx of highly motivated workers from new EU member states. (Rogge 2005; Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen 2006; SCP 2004; interview with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations).

Perceived selective deprivation of certain groups of the population may – disregarding any objective causes – lead to frustration, alienation and resistance (strain theory). This resistance may take the form of a deviant lifestyle, which could be expressed by things such as involvement in (organized) crime.

### **3.3 Globalisation**

There is a growing global flow of transnational movement of people and goods, services, money and information. Dutch trade and industry have to compete with Eastern European companies that have lower labour costs. There is a shift in economic power from the United States and Europe to China and India. The United States' budget deficit will, if their policy remains unaltered, become untenable within twenty years. China has over 1,000 billion American dollars and can use that to exercise great influence over the United States and the stability of the global monetary and economic system. The majority of respondents and sources called internationalization a megatrend of the most crucial importance. (DNRI 2005; Rogge 2005; GAO 2007; Ministry of Defence/DCDC 2007; interviews with AIVD, AFM, the SIOD, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI), the VNO-NCW; Session with the DNRI).

#### **3.3.1 Increase in traffic of people and goods, services, money and information**

The connections between economies as well as social relations, knowledge networks and cultural circuits are growing larger and more widespread, across national borders. This is a consequence the Internet, but also due to the growing facilities for transport at lower

costs. There is practically no end to the creativity of (illegal) entrepreneurs. The speed, distance and spread of the traffic and the restrictive enforcement laws in various countries make guardianship and surveillance more and more difficult for government authorities. Furthermore, it is more difficult to find out in which countries “virtual” crimes are committed and which legal regimes will apply. More movement of, and trade in, goods and services entails more financial traffic (Gress 2004; Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen 2006; SCP 2004; interviews with the SIOD and AFM).

The growing global traffic certainly entails the risk of victimhood, including the vulnerability of vital information networks and transport routes. Guardianship and investigation are hindered in their effectiveness, such when the unravelling of transnationally conducted financial transactions.

### **3.3.2 The EU continues to expand**

The European Union is about to expand once again: Croatia in 2009, Macedonia at a later date, Turkey is expected to join in 2015 but its growing influence on Europe will be discernable sooner than that. Agreements have also been made concerning the borders with the new European member states, which are to be completely open. The consequences of this cannot yet be calculated. The expansion of the European Union is an increasingly politically sensitive issue, one that undermines the public support for the European project itself. (Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen 2006; interview with the VNO-NCW).

The expansion of the EU to include new member states that have great problems with organized crime and corruption may have an impact on potential perpetrators and potential victims of crimes such as extortion and traffic in women. Efficient guardianship may be hindered by possible corruption and information leaks. Besides,

Dutch entrepreneurs may be tempted to carry out actions that are in fact illegal if they are attempting set up a business in one of these countries, which may affect the integrity of Dutch society.

### **3.3.3 The emergence of new economic giants such as China, India and Brazil.**

The rise of new industrial powers such as China and India is changing the global faces of economic power and influence, employment, trade and transport. There is a new balance emerging in the market. This is forcing the prices down, which may cause problems for manufacturers in Western Europe. It is also more difficult to exercise control on the flow of products from outside the EU, such as the regulations on consumer safety. China is also supposedly acquiring substantial effects in other countries, including the Netherlands; half of the Port of Rotterdam is allegedly in Chinese hands. NB: this could not be verified within the framework of this investigation (interviews with the VNO-NCW, The Dutch Association of Insurers).

Large-scale economic competition may bring about the deprivation of Dutch entrepreneurs and their employees, making the temptation to commit crimes to all the more difficult to resist. Obscure ownership constructions may create a potential opportunity structure for perpetrators without scruples.

### **3.3.4 More spending power in new EU member states and former developing countries**

The higher standard of living in new EU member states and former developing countries means more spending power and greater economic power, but also more potential markets for manufacturers. Former developing countries with a rising BNP and increasing spending power are participating more intensively in the global markets.

Countries with newly acquired spending power provide more opportunities for illegal financial construction, for takeovers, etc. (Session with the DNRI). Moreover, the greater demand for luxury consumer goods, such as cars, cannot be fulfilled completely by regular production and trade. This applies even more when the price levels are as yet too high for local consumers. It is possible this may give rise to the emergence of local markets for goods stolen in Western Europe and other places.

### **3.3.5 Failed states as places of political and criminal freedom**

Countries where the government does not actually control the whole territory any more or where a blind eye is turned to clandestine activities may become places from where criminal and extremist factions may operate without being hindered in any way. These *failed states* can be observed in several variations in Africa and the Middle East, but also on the Balkan and other places. These places of criminal and political freedom can have harmful effects throughout the world, including in the Netherlands. The Dutch military presence in Afghanistan is intended to put a stop to these kinds of situations. (GAO 2007; Ministry of Defence/DCDC 2007).

*Failed states* and other foreign places lacking government supervision can become opportunity structures shielded from society and may be used by professional criminals from the Netherlands as well. The ability to exercise a certain degree of influence on a weak government may offer unprecedented opportunities for corruption and the misuse of state facilities for manufacturing counterfeit documents, smuggle via diplomatic channels and arms trade, etc., such as was the case in Suriname in the eighties.

### **3.4 Economic up-scaling and concentrations of power**

As a result of up-scaling, businesses are acquiring more economic power, and larger conglomerates that are more difficult to control are emerging. Transnational firms are growing in size due to expansion and takeovers, and base their decisions as to where to set up their headquarters, offices and branches on strategic grounds: the primarily economic climate, but also the political and fiscal climate. Due to their size, economic power and relative elusiveness, these types of companies are relatively powerful in relation to the national authorities. By contrast, the European Commission guards against the formation of cartels and illegal use of government support for businesses, and has far-reaching jurisdiction to enforce it, so that currently, with the EU, the healthy competition is more closely guarded than before.

#### **3.4.1 A shift in the balance of power between companies and the national government**

Due to the up-scaling and concentrations of power within trade and industry, the influence of national governments is decreasing proportionately. (Ministry of Defence/DCDC 2007; interview with the Dutch Association of Insurers).

Large economic conglomerates operate within the cover of an impenetrable opportunity structure, which limits the possibilities for guardianship by national bodies.

#### **3.4.2 Hedge funds are becoming more active**

A hedge fund is an investment fund with limited access for private investors, so that there are fewer regulations to comply with. Pension funds and other large investors invest in hedge funds because of the large profits that depend relatively little on the share prices.

Managers of hedge funds usually invest a lot of capital in their fund, after which others invest for a period that is fixed beforehand. In 2006, hundreds of billions were invested like this. Initially, hedge funds operated on the grounds of trust in the managers (“governance through direct relations”) but now more and more business is being done anonymously and the thresholds for admittance are lower, which increases the risks of strategic mistakes. The stock raiders are being openly criticized. “Locust that buy up a company and bleed it dry,” as the Minister of Economic Affairs Joop Wijn (CDA) described the investors who took one Dutch company after the other from the stock exchange and reorganized them, in August 2006. The risks of hedge funds include the short-term perspective and the one-sided emphasis on rapid *return on investment*, without considering the sustainable interests in employment, the environment or local communities, etc. Conversely, some people think that hedge funds have a beneficial effect due to the fact that companies experiencing problems may be maintained after a thorough reorganization. (Harmes 2002; Van Oosterhout 2006; [feed://seekingalpha.com/by/symbol/fnm/feed](http://seekingalpha.com/by/symbol/fnm/feed); interview with AFM; session with the National Crime Squad (DNR)).

Hedge funds are not transparent and, for the greater part, are not regulated by the government. This entails the risk of fraud and money laundering. Some hedge funds have been accused of intentionally spreading rumours to influence the stock markets and make more profit. Moreover, there is a risk that the extremely large hedge funds can run into problems and take a whole series of companies (and investors) with them in their fall. In the United States, this has already led to large-scale interventions on the part of the national bank to bail out a hedge fund.

### **3.5 The emergence of the network economy**

In the post-industrial economy, companies are becoming more interrelated, creating chains of suppliers and sub-contractors that often encompass several countries. Large-scale projects such as the building of an infrastructure are frequently done by syndicates of several firms, each with its own specific contribution. The changing structure of the economy is leading to the emergence of new types of collaboration and business models, in which speed and flexibility are core values. Knowledge is one of the “commodities”, and is an outstanding example as its deployment is established via these networks. (De Korte et al. 2003; interviews with the AIVD and the SIOD).

#### **3.5.1 Economic deprivation due to deterioration of research & development**

The Netherlands has lost its position among the world leaders as far as investments in education and research are concerned. Accordingly, the Netherlands is no longer an international competitor in the growing service industry. Improvement of the knowledge economy is on the political agenda, but there has, as yet, been no real change in that direction.

If the deteriorated competitiveness has a detrimental influence on employment, (relative) deprivation may be a motivation for potential perpetrators.

#### **3.5.2 Knowledge as an economically desirable commodity**

Research and development of new technologies and products are the driving forces behind economies. The United States once accounted for 70% of the global research & development; now that is only 30%. New economic giants like China and, to a lesser extent, India

are employing every possible means to get ahead. Because of this, R&D is has become a vulnerable branch of industry for (industrial) espionage (GAO 2007; Ministry of Defence/DCDC 2007; De Vos 2007; interviews with the AIVD, the VNO-NCW and the Dutch Association of Insurers).

Industrial espionage in the Netherlands is scarcely included on the policy agenda at all: only the AIVD and the Ministry of Economic Affairs pay any attention to it. However, in the context of proliferation, it is essential this country guards itself against industrial espionage. Dutch knowledge centres are increasingly accessible to foreign students, which entails certain risks. The nuclear technology used by a number of countries including Pakistan, North Korea and Iran was stolen from Urenco in Almelo (the Netherlands) by the Pakistani student and Minister of Energy to be, Abdul Qadeer Khan, in 1975. Industrial espionage may become a matter of particular interest to the police and the judiciary, but only when a sensational incident occurs.

### **3.5.3 Informal contacts are becoming more significant**

Due to superfast computer connections and increasingly cheaper physical transport, there is currently less need for a (n) (urban) concentration of all the divisions of a company's operational processes. Though this is still very much the case for business activities such as manufacture and assembly, it does not apply to operations such as innovation and upper management. Due to globalisation, the necessity for concentration of the highest positions of the economy is, in fact, growing. Metropolitan areas are becoming centres of innovation and accommodate many international concentrations attracted by their cosmopolitan allure (interviews with the AIVD and the SIOD).

The power of innovative centres may also entail risks, for instance, if the “underworld” and legitimate companies start to become

interwoven. This would facilitate the finding of accomplices against the background of a high-grade opportunity structure.

#### **3.5.4 Businesses are forced to respond to individualization**

The massive individualization is expressed in the large-scale satisfaction of individual needs of customers by companies. In this sense, it can be regarded as an answer to the growing demand for bespoke services. The individual asks, demands even, products and services that are more suited to his individual lifestyle and needs. (De Korte et al. 2003).

In the future, manufacturers will attempt to accommodate the whimsical, individual consumers to size, on time and against the lowest cost. To do this, companies will need large amounts of detailed information about the individual consumers, which in turn can be traded, creating opportunities for fraud and deceit.

#### **3.5.5 Interrelations between the “underworld” and legitimate businesses**

The traditional distinction between the “respectable society” and the territory of systematic criminals, often called the legitimate businesses and the underworld, is, in reality, not practical. Entrepreneurs from very diverse branches of trade and industry and from very respectable companies prove to be prepared to, and capable of, damaging society by means of fraudulent constructions, secret cartel agreements and the like for years, for large sums of money. And vice versa, criminal entrepreneurs often have little difficulty in finding facilitators to launder money and obtain commodities. Increasingly closer-knit relations and symbiosis between legal and illegal territories have been mentioned. From a cultural perspective, some serious criminals have acquired a quasi-heroic status in the media and some crime reporters allegedly run errands and help out famous delinquents (Van

Duyne et al. 2006; interviews with AFM, the SIOD, the VNO-NCW and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations; session with the DNRI).

The closely-knit relations have an effect on potential perpetrators as it becomes easier to find accomplices and because it provides an opportunity structure. It would also appear that criminal groups are attempting to infiltrate employees in to companies such as transport firms, to be able to tip off information about valuable cargoes from within and to help out in other ways. This and similar cultivation of internal sources weakens the positions of potential victims and reinforces the information position of perpetrators, who will have more and more success when they strike.

### **3.6 Growing importance of socially responsible entrepreneurship**

Growth and profit seem to have been the maxim of most businesses in the previous decades. However, recently there seems to be more value set by sustainability and justice (De Korte et al. 2003; Dexter 2006).

#### **3.6.1 Growing demand for integrity within companies**

In the public opinion, much attention has been paid to the structure regime (the obligation to have a board of commissioners in large companies, which guarantees, to a certain extent, the influence of the employees councils). The corporate governance in the wider sense of the word is also being debated. Integrity is increasingly regarded as a matter of trust and responsibility. This goes deeper than avoiding cases of fraud, and also relates to the issue of high salaries for the board and the responsibilities of the board of commissioners. Self-protection is the driving force behind integrity. Doubts have arisen

about the integrity of certain professional groups. One example of this is the legal profession, which is under attack due to the unduly high hourly rates and insufficient professional distance to clients. The accountancy branch has been accused of not intervening in time to prevent damage caused by fraud. Even the role of the commissioner as a supervisor is debatable. In many issues concerning integrity, there is lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities (interview with the Dutch Association of Insurers).

The increased interest in integrity is an inhibiting factor on crime as regards potential perpetrators and supervisory bodies.



# 4 Political macrorends and mesotrends

Schematic overview of political macrorends and mesotrends

1. ***Increasing decentralization, but more decisions are made at EU level*** (Ch. 4.1)
  - 1.1 Revival of regionalism and a predilection for things on a smaller scale
  - 1.2 The European Union's influence on its member states is growing
2. ***The shift from a bureaucratic to transparent, customer-oriented organization*** (Ch. 4.2)

Business-like operations to please the customer  
Mounting crisis in trust between citizen and government
3. ***Liberalization of legislation and regulations*** (Ch. 4.3)
  - 3.1 The on-going deregulation of the market
  - 3.2 Government continues marketization
4. ***Enforcement policy*** (Ch. 4.4)
  - 4.1 Insufficient surveillance
  - 4.2 Collaboration and tension between administration and investigation
  - 4.3 Criminal proceedings are not of an optimal standard
  - 4.4 Surveillance, guardianship and enforcement are increasingly often in hands of third parties
  - 4.5 More transparent government action entails additional risks
  - 4.6 Diminishing policy of tolerance
5. ***Polarisation*** (Ch.4.5)
  - 5.1 More extreme matters supported in mainstream politics
  - 5.2 Radicalisation
6. ***The influence of politics on the direction of police work*** (Ch. 4.6)

The politics at local, national and European level have growing influence on police policy  
Police set too more store by "easily scored cases"  
When tension mounts due to terrorism, the pressure increases on the rest of law enforcement
7. ***The government's withdrawal versus the growing role of the societal midfield*** (Ch. 4.7)

The government is assuming more of a director's seat among by (potential) partners in network partnerships  
NGOs and umbrella organizations are growing in importance  
Influence via the Internet despite lack of budget

## 4.1 Increasing decentralization but more are decisions made at EU level

The administrative influence of the national government is diminishing and there is more and more emphasis on the local authorities. The Dutch municipalities are more frequently the immediate point of contact for their citizens. This is in contrast

with the growing influence of the European Union. More and more important decisions are being taken at a European level. The national governments are converting this to their own countries and are acting as intermediaries and supervisory bodies for the execution of this policy by local governments (De Korte et al. 2003; Dexter 2006; Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen 2006).

#### **4.1.1 Revival of regionalism and the predilection for things on a small scale**

Within the European Union, the regions where the population feels strongly connected by their common ethnicity or by their culturally established identity, there is a growing degree of autonomy, and as a consequence, they are more oriented on their own region. Conversely, parts of the Dutch countryside are threatened by depopulation, though nevertheless, more and more people have a second house far from the towns and cities, or even in another country ([www.calre.eu](http://www.calre.eu); [www.sociaalvitaalplatteland.nl](http://www.sociaalvitaalplatteland.nl)).

A strong regionally administrative orientation may develop at the expense of combating corruption and dealing with less visible kinds of organized crime, but this does not seem to be the case in the Netherlands. However, potential victims in remote areas may be more vulnerable and a consequence of depopulation will be less informal guardianship, as a result of the diminished social control.

#### **4.1.2 The European Union's influence on its member states is growing**

To an increasingly degree, "Brussels" decides to which regulations the economic, social and legal traffic in the EU member states must comply. This keeps both the local and the national governments on their toes (interviews with the Ministry of Justice and the SIOD; Session with the DNR).

EU interference can prevent arbitrary acts and fraud to a certain extent, and accordingly, specific legal knowledge of EU regulations is a desirable commodity, and this applies to criminals too. However, Dutch authorities may presume that certain issues will be tackled by “Brussels” as the role of the EU grows, and this may, in fact, lead to a vacuum.

## **4.2 A shift from a bureaucratic to a transparent, customer-oriented organization**

The trust put by citizens in their government is slipping and there is a danger that a divide will separate the citizens from the government. Meanwhile, our society is becoming more complex, and these are enough reasons for the government to reorganize and modernize. Matters of particular interest in the new policy are: effectiveness, efficiency, flexibility, taking fast action, customer-friendliness and reducing bureaucratic inconvenience. One of the first results was the dualism in the administration of local councils. For this, an attempt was made to make the organization more transparent by separating the post of alderman from the position on the council. Government organizations can deploy ICT resources such as email, websites and call centres to create more transparency and to be able to reach the target groups for whom their policy is designed. The use of ICT for the improvement of services should contribute to more efficient operational processes in public organizations. The aim is that, within the public domain, the bureaucratic organization and culture will be transformed into a more horizontal organization (De Korte et al. (2003).

#### **4.2.1 Business-like operations to please the customers**

Independent, more mature and responsible citizens who are more capable of making comparisons between products and services can force authorities to introduce more business-like and customer-oriented forms of organization. Nevertheless, as long as the government cannot go bankrupt, one cannot really speak of “customers” (interview with the Dutch Association of Insurers; Session with the DNR).

The growing interest in customer-friendliness is regarded as an inhibiting factor for crime, because potential perpetrators can be become deterred, and/or become less frustrated and less motivated to display formally deviant behaviour.

#### **4.2.2 Mounting crisis of confidence between citizens and government**

The number of complaints received by the National Ombudsman in 2006 rose to record-height, which led the Ombudsman to conclude that the government is growing out of touch with the citizens. The Rathenau Institute has also warned that the confidence in the government, which in Dutch relations has been regarded as almost self-evident, is becoming eroded to a large extent. A polarization is noticeable in the way in which individual citizens and society as a whole approach the government. Politicians are called to account or even attacked for their actions by the media. A crisis of confidence, for example in regard to criminal law enforcement, cannot be disregarded (National ombudsman (2007); interviews with the Rathenau Institute and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations; [www.21minuten.nl](http://www.21minuten.nl)).

If a crisis of confidence does indeed arise, this may have an adverse effect on guardianship and investigation.

## **4.3 Liberalization of legislation and regulations**

The growing cultural diversity in Europe due to immigration is stimulating the international trade; particularly goods and services from migration countries are being imported, although its share, in comparison with trade flows between EU countries among themselves and between the EU and the United States is marginal. In addition, the informal economy and globalisation are reasons for companies to operate on an increasingly international scale. As a result, international competition is growing. Globalisation is undermining the ability of national governments to guide: an example of this is the multinational companies who build their offices in countries with a climate that is financially favourable for entrepreneurs. The public administration's policy is contributing to this by making the market more transparent, especially in Europe: laws are made compatible, and a joint currency has been introduced, the euro. It is also the intention that Europe will act as a unit in political affairs (De Korte et al. 2003; interviews with the SIOD and the VNO-NCW).

### **4.3.1 On-going deregulation of the market**

The number of rules is to be kept to a minimum: many of the current laws that govern the market are to be repealed to improve the balance between supply and demand. De-regulation offers more freedom to companies and entrepreneurs (a case in point is the Taxi Act). The companies and entrepreneurs, not the government, are to organize the market ([www.andereoverheid.nl](http://www.andereoverheid.nl)).

Deregulation will cause the intensity of government supervision to diminish, which may have a stimulating effect on crime. If self-regulation within a branch of industry proves to be effective, this stimulating effect may be neutralized.

### **4.3.2 Government continues marketization**

The government's policy is to liberalize more and more markets. Another form of marketization/privatisation within the government is to outsource its services to third parties. The government is focusing more and more on drawing up policies and allowing third parties to execute these policies. However, some people have noticed a turning point. Currently, they have observed that all too often, matters are viewed from a topdown perspective, i.e. exclusively from the companies' point of view, not from the consumers' perspective at all. Companies are to compete with each other, as is happening in the power industry. But in real competition, the losing party will eventually go bankrupt, which will not be good for the marketization. It is not unlikely that the government will reverse this trend because it will eventually prove to be unduly customer-unfriendly if it is carried out without any guarantees to safeguard the quality. The degree in which marketization is supported depends greatly on the political climate. However, for the period 2006-2007, it looked as if a clear turning-point had been reached, even in the political midfield, and currently a much more critical view is taken of the undesirable effects of marketization. At the same time, European law is forcing the liberalization of certain sectors, such as public transport branch (*Platform Fraude in beeld* (2007); interview with the Dutch Association of Insurers).

Far-reaching marketization in which a cowboy mentality catches on can give scope to illegal actions in an organized context, for instance, in the public transport sector and the taxi branch.

## **4.4 Enforcement policy**

There is a shift from criminal law enforcement to administrative and civil law enforcement (DNRI 2005).

#### **4.4.1 Insufficient surveillance**

Forced by limited budgets and capacity, and by the primacy of economic interests and the necessity for quick processing, government bodies can only carry out their surveillance tasks to a limited degree. Physical inspections are increasingly often replaced by information analyses and by monitoring data traffic based on profiles. The parameters and rules that are used in these choice models are sensitive, because if you know the search criteria, you can reduce the chances of actual inspection substantially. The emphasis that had been on the reinforcement of enforcement since 2002 has now met with opposition, from areas such as umbrella organizations. For instance, there is an agreement that all costs of enforcement must be reduced by 25% and that an organization may be inspected twice annually at most. Conversely, the BODs have noticed the emergence of a more pro-active, selective and decisive enforcement strategy based on information-directed enforcement. This requires intensive cooperation, because, due to the increased complexity of that which is discovered, fraud-law enforcers, from guardianship through to investigation and criminal proceedings, need each other's knowledge and information. If the judicial bodies cannot take any legal action due to lack of knowledge and capacity, the possibilities of guardianship authorities should be examined more thoroughly (*Platform Fraude in Beeld* 2007; interviews with the Ministry of Justice, the SIOD and AFM).

Reducing inspections means in fact that guardianship is reduced, which is a crime-stimulating factor.

#### **4.4.2 Collaboration and tension between administration and investigation**

As a result of the dispersion of the government and a restrictive (privacy) legislation, the exchange of information between judiciary

services and other bodies is often trouble-some. The difference in culture and divergent methods also obstruct effective collaboration. Nevertheless, the conflict potential between administration and investigation may diminish as the government delegates some matters and decisions to a lower level (to the local council and Provinces) and more matters are settled by local councils. The possibility of straightforward cases such as travel insurance fraud being dealt with in other ways is being studied. It is being considered whether the Public Prosecutor's Office can assess the case and then impose a fine, whereby the sum of the transfer would be twice the sum required from the client. The Central Fine Collection Agency would collect the fines; the police would not have to become involved (Stuurgroep Samen werken aan Veiligheid 2006; interview with the Dutch Association of Insurers).

The extent of the collaboration will determine whether the guardianship will be impeded or, by contrast, become more efficient, so that may be considered either a crime-inhibiting factor or a crime-stimulating factor.

#### **4.4.3 Criminal proceedings are not of an optimal standard**

The Public Prosecutor's Office has to work with time limits and has to make choices out of necessity - choices that do not always produce the desired results. The policy pertaining to criminal law and its practical consequences are at the centre of attention, and consequently, incidences can have great repercussions. (Van Wijck et al. 2007).

The repercussions mentioned above can distract from a more effective policy that would be crime-inhibiting. If the judicial authorities were to become the subject of an in-depth investigation, its credibility would evaporate and it would also be actually crippled for a lengthy period, for instance as a result of a parliamentary investigation; it may have a crime-stimulating effect during that period.

#### **4.4.4 Control, supervision and enforcement increasingly often in hands of third parties**

Within the framework of the public-private collaboration and the withdrawal of the government, the supervision of the observance of legal rule is increasingly the responsibility of non-governmental bodies, such as business security services. The literature calls it *third party policing* (Buerger & Mazerolle 1998; Buerger 2007; Klerks et al. 2001, 2005; interview with the Ministry of Justice).

This may cause problems for the selective non-enforcement and corruption when the interests of the community and the interests of trade and industry do not match.

#### **4.4.5 More transparent government action entails additional risks**

Malicious people who want elude the law can acquire quite detailed information on the policy and possibilities of relevant government bodies (Klerks et al. 2002; <http://mediatheek.politieacademie.nl>)

Criminals who are informed of surveillance regimes, investigation priorities and the like have more possibilities for cunning evasive behaviour and can enjoy their illegal profits without being punished.

#### **4.4.6 Diminishing policy of tolerance**

Though matters that are formally prohibited may still be tolerated by reason of opportunity, tolerance is losing its support from politicians. It is conceivable that, under influence of foreign pressure, the Dutch soft drugs policy, for instance, could become less magnanimous. This would have huge consequences for investigation and enforcement (SCP 2004; Van Wijck et al. 2007).

The deployment of more judicial forces against the cannabis branch

would be at the expense of other priorities such as combating fraud, environmental crimes and the trafficking women. Despite this, a more restrictive policy may discourage potential criminals, because they would not want to build up a police record, for instance. This could lead to less involvement in criminal circles.

## **4.5 Polarization**

As regards both political opinions inspired by radical Islam and politics in a broader sense (partly due to Pim Fortuyn's influence), a definite polarization emerging. Citizens are tending towards more radical views and are not afraid of conflict when defending these views. However, the trend is not one-sided, as some political enthusiasm for harmony was evident in the cabinet formation in the spring of 2007.

### **4.5.1 More extreme matters are supported in mainstream politics**

The parliamentary political spectrum has had relatively strong wings to the right and left since 2002. Nevertheless, some people feel that the "radical" tendencies have become more moderate (interview with the Verwey-Jonker Institute; Session with the DNR).

More influence from radically rightwing factions may have a stimulating effect on the policy pertaining to criminal law and discourage the culture of tolerance, which may have a crime-inhibiting effect.

### **4.5.2 Radicalisation**

Radicalisation seems to be on the rise, among young people in particular, and especially as regards jihadism and the extreme right-

wing (the AIVD *Annual Report 2005*; AIVD *De gewelddadige jihad in Nederland 2006*; Groen and Kranenberg 2006).

Wide-scale participation of young people in radical sub-cultures may result in more violence, but it is also possible that there will be more involvement in organized forms of crime.

## **4.6 The influence of politics on the direction of the police work**

Politics, on both a regional and a national level, incited by the more assertive citizens, are interfering more and more in the way in which the police carry out their duties. Police organization, methods and achievements are subject to criticism as regards professionalism (solving crimes while avoiding mistakes) and deployment of capacity and reducing the bureaucracy. Performance contracts dictate stringent quantitative and qualitative criteria. (Rogge 2005; interview with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations).

### **4.6.1 The politics at local, national and European level have a growing influence on police policy**

Recent years have seen the introduction of the performance direction, an increased directional hold on the individual commissioners of police and the regional force managers and a tendency for more acceptance of responsibility for the policy they pursued. In respect to investigation, repeated and structural shortcomings were laid bare. However, the police are operating in everyday life with a great deal of professional discretion. It is proving difficult for the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice to design a joint policy for police work. The actual influence of the Public Prosecutor's Office is seen by some to be small, too. Some respondents are of the opinion that it is rather the case of a diminishing influence of political

decision makers on the police (interview with the Dutch Association of Insurers; Session with the DNR).

Political interference, on its own, is a crime-relevant factor because it has bearing on the selectiveness and intensity of guardianship and investigation. Police capacity that has to be deployed - for political reasons - against alcohol abuse at kart circuits, for instance, will not be able to have any more influence on organized crime. The extent of the actual influence of politics is a moot point, so that it remains unclear to what extent we are dealing with a crime-relevant factor.

#### **4.6.2 Police set too much store by “easily scored cases”**

According to a number of the respondents, the police design their own policy and invest primarily in cases with a well-known perpetrator. Consequently, relatively little attention is paid to organized crime and organizational crime as long as there is (are) no (in)famous offender or group of offenders in the picture (interviews with the Dutch Association of Insurers, AFM).

This seems to be a partially correct evaluation of the matter, and may have an effect on guardianship, enforcement and investigation.

#### **4.6.3 When tension mounts due to terrorism, the pressure increases on the rest of law enforcement**

A largely unpredictable factor is the degree of violence. If the such things as the technology of improvised explosives (IED) against transports or vital infrastructures, or other guerilla tactics should find their way to Europe – and experts think that it is not improbable - it will put a great deal of pressure on the available police capacity (*3rd Annual Countering IEDs Conference*, Schiphol, 15-16 May 2007).

It is known that, in the larger cities and on a national level at the Netherlands Police Agency (KLPD), there is a substantial deployment of police capacity for terrorism cases. Although some additional

capacity was employed for this, it still has an effect on the available capacity of the National Crime Squad (DNR) and other departments for the investigation of serious and organized crime.

## **4.7 The government's withdrawal versus the growing role of the societal midfield**

The government's role in a society that is being increasingly regarded as an egalitarian network society is becoming more of a mediating and directing one instead of a dirigiste role. As a result, the relative importance and influence of the NGOs and pressure groups is growing. The egalitarian effect of the Internet is reinforcing this process; an individual, by broadcasting the right message, may have a direct influence in societal processes.

### **4.7.1 Government is assuming more of a director's role among (potential) partners in network partnerships**

The "empty state" and the "virtual state" searching for new forms of conversion from political programmes to societal changes. Anyone who wants to influence society as an administrator cannot rely simply on passing legislation and issuing commands. This has been replaced by enticement, stimulation and facilitation. The government has become one of the many network players (interviews with the SIOD, the Dutch Association of Insurers, and the VNO-NCW).

The diminishing possibilities for immediate direction on guardianship means that less attention can be paid to invisible crime, and according, it may be regarded as a factor that affects the strategy for dealing with forms of organized crime.

#### **4.7.2 NGOs and umbrella organizations are growing in significance**

As more societal discussions are being held and societal decisions are being made outside the sphere of the government and formal representative forums, the role of non-governmental organizations has grown in importance. More and more often, citizens appear to be looking after their own interests by membership of, or involvement in, NGOs and pressure groups such as consumer associations and patient groups. By contrast, some NGOs have been assigned a less prominent role after the events of 11 September.

Trade and industry are exercising increasing influence via umbrella organizations; these ties are regarded, by the government, as partners in network arrangements and partnerships. Public-private collaboration (PPC) is a collaboration partnership in which the government and trade and industry - while maintaining their own identity and responsibility – carry out a project jointly on the basis of a clear division of tasks and risks. The aim is to achieve more added value and efficiency. Both on a local and a national level, there is more and more collaboration within PPC constructions, in particular as regards security. The National Platform for Crime Control headed by the Ministry of Justice is a good illustration of this: as a result of the organization of collaboration and guardianship based on PPC, a falling trend in crime against trade and industry is noticeable (interviews with the VNO-NCW and the Dutch Association of Insurers; Session with the DNR).

More cooperation and more frequent information exchange between umbrella organizations and branch organizations have a positive effect on the self-protection of businesses and therefore reduce potential victimhood.

### **4.7.3 Influence via the Internet despite lack of budget**

Individuals and relatively small factions can, despite their small budgets, can still exert influence on societal processes. Websites such as YouTube and Geenstijl.nl and the popularity of weblogs enable well-chosen statements or manifestations, such as the video recordings of an incident to be viewed and heard by very many people, and can have an effect on societal processes that is difficult to predict and control. The relevance of traditional news and information channels is diminishing too, as incidents can be passed on immediately and almost unfiltered to consumers via the Internet (Ministry of Defence/DCDC (2007); interview with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations).

The unpredictable influence of pressure groups and even individuals may lead to such things as incident politics and a persistent “putting out fires” strategy which distracts from more structural and well considered policy, is consequently a crime-relevant factor.



# 5 Technological macrotrends and mesotrends

Schematic overview of technological macrotrends and mesotrends

1. ***The explosive growth of electronic data and data traffic*** (Ch. 5.1)
  - 1.1 The Internet is used more and more
  - 1.2 The advance of broadband
  - 1.3 Use of the Internet for radical associations
  - 1.4 Growing opportunities for receiving stolen goods
  - 1.5 Internet empowers users
  - 1.6 Better facilities for opening and connecting large data files
2. ***Convergence of the media*** (Ch. 5.2)
  - 2.1 Integration of mobile and fixed telephone lines, cell phones and the Internet, speech and data
3. ***Progress in electronic observation and tracking*** (Ch. 5.3)
  - 3.1 Tracking & tracing using RFID, GPS transponders, chemical markers and other technology
  - 3.2 Shielding from surveillance is increasingly important for criminals
4. ***More intensive use of nuclear technology*** (Ch. 5.4)
5. ***ICT provides opportunities but threatens privacy*** (Ch. 5.5)
  - 5.1 Technological resources used insufficiently for guardianship and investigation
  - 5.2 A market is emerging for identity
  - 5.3 Resisting technology: "new Luddism"
  - 5.4 Strategy for dealing with advanced forms of fraud will be pursued increasingly by private agents
  - 5.5 (Dis)information can be distributed rapidly and almost uncontrollably via the Internet
6. ***Ground-breaking technologies*** (H5.6)

Nanotechnology will be introduced from approximately 2010 onwards  
The introduction of new stimulants

## 5.1 Explosive growth of electronic data and data traffic

Modern society is characterized by a significant increase in information. We now have more books, telephones, computers, televisions and radios than ever and more and more information is available via these media. The extent in which data is made digitally accessible is growing at an explosive rate. According to the Stichting Toekomstbeeld der Techniek (STT) [a foundation that identifies new

trends and develops inspiring views on the future of “technology and society”], an equal amount of coded information will be generated in the next ten years as in all previous years (De Korte et al. 2003).

### **5.1.1 The Internet is used more and more**

Currently, there is a rapid growth of data traffic across the fixed telephone network. Increasingly often, new ways of giving everyone access to the Internet are being sought. This abundance of “information” may lead to feelings of alienation and loss of control, and may increase the risks of deception and fraud. Furthermore, the Internet has, in so many ways, a multiplier-effect, which also allows criminals to create an almost infinite number of fraud constructions. To illustrate: once the possibilities for sending post were limited by the capacity of copiers and the capacity for franking letters, but now emails can be sent by the millions without any trouble at all, which greatly increases the chances of damage (interview with the AIVD; session with the DNRI).

The omnipresent Internet offers an unparalleled opportunity structure. This has an effect on potential perpetrators, on potential victims and on guardianship. The Internet is one of the most important crime-relevant factors of our time.

### **5.1.2 Advance of broadband**

As a result of the increase in broadband Internet, video conferencing will probably make physical travel less necessary, and all sorts of other new forms of social traffic will be possible by means of virtual reality, etc. (interview with the AIVD; session with the DNRI).

New forms of Internet use will provide opportunities both for investigation and for perpetrators, which means that it is both a inhibiting and a stimulating factor for crime, depending on the specific circumstances and the category of the offence.

### **5.1.3 Use of Internet by radical associations**

Radical associations use the Internet for communication among themselves and for drawing up plans, but also for collecting information, funding, recruitment and sabotage (NCTB 2006; Conway 2006).

In as far as radicalism and organized crime overlap (and there is evidence of this in the physical world, as regards facilitation, etc.), this will have an impact on potential perpetrators.

### **5.1.4 Growing opportunities for receiving stolen goods**

Internet and cheap digital information carriers enable criminal factions to receive stolen goods and other matters, including work that is protected by copyright. This can be done more efficiently and with fewer risks via the Internet, which functions as an opportunity structure, than “on the street” (interview with the VNO-NCW).

This and similar Internet use influences potential perpetrators and victims (the injured party) while impeding guardianship.

### **5.1.5 Internet empowers users**

The number of weblogs doubles globally every six months. Independent, responsible users who distrust the official communication by companies and institutions increasingly influence the images of those companies and institutions. Virtual communities form the foundations for new political opportunity coalitions and the formation of power. A case in point is the influence of Maurice de Hond on judicial policy. Increasingly more people are moving in virtual circles (GAO 2007; interview with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations).

The impact of this development is still difficult to assess and depends on the specific circumstances connected to the area of the offence.

On the one hand, it may make the potential victims more aware and resilient, on the other, it offers the opportunity for influencing guardianship and investigation.

### **5.1.6 Better facilities for opening and connecting large data files**

Government services, companies and individuals are becoming increasingly capable of data mining and text mining software data from very divergent sources and linking files to each other to extract new information from them. This provides new opportunities for investigation but there also risks as regards personal lives and the controllability (Vedder et al. 2007; interview with the Rathenau Institute).

This could be a crime-inhibiting factor if the opportunities provided are actually used for investigation.

## **5.2 Convergence of the media**

The traditional media are merging more and more together. Integration may relate to the convergence of text, image and sound (and maybe even smells in the future) as well as the convergence of the computer, television and telephone. Services are increasingly available on several devices (integration of functionalities in devices) and do not depend on the technology. In addition, an integration of networks reveals how communication networks flow seamlessly into one another, both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal means that the networks are on the same level; vertical means that they are connected to a level higher: larger networks, etc. Decentred networks can be connected to each other by means of flexible interface systems (De Korte et al. 2003).

### **5.2.1 Integration of mobile and fixed telephone lines, cell phones and the Internet, speech and data**

The virtual world is becoming increasingly one cohesive territory that can be entered through numerous gateways (De Korte et al. 2003).

This integrated virtual world can offer a far better opportunity structure than the current Internet can, and is therefore a crime-stimulating factor, although new forms of guardianship and investigation will evolve too.

## **5.3 Progress in electronic observation and tracking**

In the near future, miniature robots and microelectronics will be able to carry out covert observation at greater distances or in places that are difficult to reach - initially for government services, but eventually private individuals will make use of them. As a result, a whole new industry is starting to emerge focusing on the greater powers of observation and protection against unwanted surveillance. However, tracking for logistic purposes in trade and industry has already intensified considerably. Tracking contains the possibility to determine someone's location and tagging (by means of RFID, for instance) means locating equipment or objects by means of an embedded chip, etc. Location is done by means of relay stations for mobile phone networks. This technology will be used for such matters as security and protection; in the event of calamities, it will enable the authorities to trace people in the vicinity. In business environs, tracking can be applied to the deployment and joint cooperation of staff. Objects such as cars are easier to trace. For reasons of privacy, tracking is a sensitive issue. Regulation is necessary to the extent in which and the conditions under which people and objects may be tracked (De Korte et al. 2003; Heal et al. 2006).

### **5.3.1 Tracking & tracing by means of RFID, GPS transponders, chemical markers and other technology**

Tracking & tracing is becoming increasingly important in trade traffic, as well as postal traffic, public transport, surveillance and security, etc. Technology has been miniaturized and become affordable to such an extent that identification is not only possible at packaging level, but can also be used for separate items, i.e. for larger or more expensive objects. Detection systems are omnipresent and are versatile to use, providing many new opportunities for investigation. Tracking & tracing is greatly encouraged by the insurance branch for protecting cars and other expensive items against theft. Its drawback is the rise in more personally oriented crimes such as car jacking and home-jacking (hold-ups) to acquire keys and to by-pass the technology (De Korte et al. 2003; Heal et al. 2006; interviews with the Rathenau Institute, the Dutch Association of Insurers and the VNO-NCW).

Tracking & tracing offers greater possibilities for guardianship, which makes it a crime-inhibiting factor, if guardianship and investigation actually take advantage of the opportunities provided.

### **5.3.2 Shielding from surveillance is increasingly important for criminals**

In criminal circles, experiences, etc. are exchanged about shielding with the intention of avoiding detection by (potential) victims of fraud and the evasion of surveillance and government interventions. An advanced level of evading behaviour characterises the professional criminal. The more intensively the government can deploy advanced investigation and tracing methods, the more important it becomes for criminals to shield their clandestine activities. This may result in a new facilitatory specialism with corresponding aspects such as marketization, R&D, industrial espionage, etc. It is possible that

organized crime will employ ICT experts and this will create a new facilitatory network. It is evident from research that the computer service branch is sensitive to fraud (interviews with the AIVD, the SIOD, AFM, and the Rathenau Institute; Session with the DNR).

The ability to evade surveillance is one of the core competences of every criminal who takes him or herself seriously. The extent to which this is professionally organized is an important crime-stimulating factor.

## **5.4 More intensive use of nuclear technology**

Pressurized by the increasing scarcity of fossil fuels and the necessity to limit the emissions of greenhouse gasses, the willingness to use atomic energy is rising; this entails new risks of accidents and terrorist attacks. In addition, there is a greater chance that more countries, including nations with politically unstable and radical regimes, will have nuclear weapons at their disposal. And finally, it has emerged from recent case histories that the smuggling of fissionable material by criminals actually occurs. Proliferation and attempts by countries such as North Korea and Iran to develop their own nuclear power have created a large demand. Fissionable material – when offered to the right buyer – can command unprecedented high prices per unit of weight on the black market. Furthermore, few phenomena can cause as much panic as the news reports on radioactive substances that are being used in ways that could contaminate the public – either consciously or unconsciously. (Ministry of Defence/DCDC (2007).

More intensive use and proliferation of nuclear technology increase the chances of misuse for criminal, terrorist and terror intentions and this makes it a crime-relevant factor.

## **5.5 ICT provides more opportunities and threatens privacy**

The continuing miniaturization and integration of ICT into all sorts of products and processes and eventually even living creatures, for example in the shape of *Radio-Frequency Identification* (RFID) and *Near Field Communication* (NFC) allows, in theory, the monitoring of practically all movements of goods and individuals from a distance and to identify them on the grounds of behaviour profiling. The introduction of the concept nodal orientation reveals that the police are actually preparing for this to a certain extent. This raises new questions pertaining to the protection of personal life in relation to possible misuse by the government or by unauthorized parties (Dexter 2006; Wood (Ed.) 2006; interviews with AIVD, the VNO-NCW and the Dutch Association of Insurers).

### **5.5.1 Technological resources used insufficiently for guardianship and investigation**

Budget, knowledge and, to a certain extent, the considerations of privacy of personal life and out-dated legislation pose limits on the application of technology within guardianship and investigation. In the eyes of many people, guardians and investigative bodies do not make the most of the opportunities to achieve more from information-based collaboration. The increasing use of portable electronics, with facilities for secure and/or anonymous transfers of data and credit, make it even more difficult to trace any illegal transactions (GAO 2007; Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen 2006; interview with the SIOD; session with the DNR).

Insufficient use of technology for guardianship and investigation has a crime-stimulating effect, as the effectiveness of the guardianship and investigation is below par.

## 5.5.2 A market is emerging for identity

The more the security in both the physical and virtual world improves, the greater the value of resources by which people can acquire a false identity becomes. This applies even more within a system with relatively high security of identification, in which a form of identification, once legitimately acknowledged, provides great freedom of movement and action. The Internet (on things like the market websites) also provides opportunities to build up a reputation of reliability by organizing favourable customer reviews. Biometric methods of identification will be used increasingly as support to procure safe social and economic traffic, as well as the identification of suspects. Within a few years, bio-sensing technology will enable to protect biological traces of identification relatively easily, cheaply and (practically) unnoticeably. Alternatively, advanced computer and reproduction technology that was, until recently, inaccessible for most people is now increasingly becoming common property. This technology and the ability to download fonts, logos, etc. via the Internet make it easier to make counterfeit papers and to document misleading constructions, especially in combination with fake websites and phishing techniques. Only specialized institutes are capable of discovering good counterfeits, and so the possibilities for fraud and swindles are practically unlimited. Guardians have ascertained that sometimes reports submitted via institutes or by accountants to support the credibility of fraudsters do not square with reality (Heal et al. 2006; Schultz et al. 2004; interviews with the Rathenau Institute, AFM and the AIVD; session with the DNRI). The influence of the identity factor is complicated. On the one hand, forms of fraud-resistant identification techniques that are widely used are an obvious crime-inhibiting factor. On the other, each obstruction for criminals creates a new market, and the facilitators will specialize in this area, forming a stimulating factor for organized crime.

### **5.5.3 Resisting technology: “new Luddism”**

New technologies will have more and more effect on integral aspects of human existence, for instance on free will, physical integrity and expressions of freedom. In addition, ecological threats will manifest themselves as a result of climate change, the scarcity of commodities and the growing use of nuclear power. Moreover, it has emerged that data collected on the pretext of security measures is being used for economic purposes. It is possible that organized resistance against these developments will emerge (Levin & Jensen 2006; <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neo-luddism>; interview with the Rathenau Institute; session with the DNR).

It is, as yet, uncertain whether a new form of Luddism will emerge on a large scale. However, if this is the case, it may have an adverse effect on guardianship.

### **5.5.4 Strategy for dealing with advanced forms of fraud will be pursued increasingly by private agents**

The government, and the police in particular, may prove to be insufficiently capable of preventing and controlling advanced forms of fraud by means of ICT. Private parties will increasingly protect their own interests by dealing with it themselves. This will create obscure domains and theatres of punishment. As it happens, it also occurs more and more often, in less complicated cases of fraud, that the responsibility is shifted to the private parties, who are assisted by public parties when they cannot deal with it on their own (Levin & Jensen 2006; interview with the Dutch Association of Insurers).

If this private approach is effective, it is a crime-inhibiting factor. A government that has less insight into, and control over, substantial areas of crime is, however, in a weak position for reducing the crime in question.

### **5.5.5 (Dis)information can be distributed rapidly and almost uncontrollably via the Internet**

On the Internet, a professional-looking website can be built with relatively little effort. Though fraudsters would formerly be caught out if their presentation and business space were not credible enough, nowadays, both real companies and fronts can be run from a bedroom. Credibility is quickly created, certainly if any accomplices from the network can express the trustworthiness of a fraudster by proclaiming his or her satisfaction with the products or services rendered on an auction site. Besides fraud for financial gain, rumours and intentionally spread lies can have an uncontrollable influence on social, political, economic and judicial processes and procedures. There are also more threats and insults (GAO 2007; interview with AFM; session with the DNRI).

The ability to successfully spread incorrect and manipulated information has a negative impact on both potential victims and guardianship and investigation.

## **5.6 Ground-breaking technologies**

Various new technologies combined together will have ground-breaking results: these are the Converging Technologies, also known, in this connection, as *Human Enhancement*. It is not merely cosmetic technology: not curing the sick, but “making better people”. A case in point is the special amphetamines given to pilots to keep them awake longer and to respond more efficiently. They are used in Iraq, for example. It concerns technology that enhances the professional effectiveness, but can also have a hedonist aspect. The development of nanotechnology will foment a revolution in the design and use of materials, probably around 2012, of which the consequences cannot yet be predicted in detail. The implications for such areas such as

the computer industry, the healthcare industry, the clothing industry, the building industry and the design and manufacture of all sorts of equipment and utensils will be comparable to the introduction of plastics in the twentieth century – but multiplied by the factor ten. The British Ministry of Defence has warned about the possibility of nanotechnology, biotechnology and very advanced weapons systems such as directed energy or electro-magnetic pulse weapons becoming runaway technology, with catastrophic consequences ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implications\\_of\\_nanotechnology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implications_of_nanotechnology); Ministry of Defence/DCDC 2007; interview with the Rathenau Institute).

### **5.6.1 Nanotechnology will be introduced from 2010 onwards**

Nanotechnology is the manipulation of materials at a molecular level, which entails the possibility of new properties of the material, such as unprecedented strength, flexibility, transparency, embedded sensors, pharmaceutical effects on very specific bodily functions at cellular level, “motors” and instruments in micrometer size, etc. The introduction of this new technology will start a revolution in the manufacture and processing of products in next fifteen years and onwards. New - and for us - undreamed-of functions and applications will become possible in areas of material safety, medical applications, observation technology and microelectronics, etc. This will have far-reaching consequences for security, crime and law enforcement. The nanotechnology will have drastic consequences in its relation with microelectronics: everything will become “nanofied”. New methods of diagnostics and treatment will evolve in the medical world, including in the science of the brain. Nanotechnology will also have a huge impact on weapon technology; in the United States it has already had a considerable impact. A case in point is the application in espionage, for instance the “insects” that can covertly go on surveillance with videos and audio devices. Remember that not only the government can implement these devices; they can also be used

for industrial espionage (GAO 2007; Anton 2001; interview with the Rathenau Institute).

Although the introduction of applications based on nanotechnology will initially be very modest, it can be expected that “nano” will be brought on the market in a greater diversity from approximately 2010 onwards. After a while, its influence – including its impact on new forms of crime and how that must be fought – will be huge. In the future, it will be a crime-relevant factor, of which the nature and scope is currently unpredictable.

### **5.6.2 The introduction of new stimulants**

Within a few years, new pharmacological and micro-electronic technology will provide powerful mind-influencing medicines (interview with the Rathenau Institute; <http://futureimperative.blogspot.com>).

If the government puts restrictions on the use and trade of these and other new drugs, organized crime will become interested. This may create a new market for illegal stimulants and narcotics.



# 6 Ecological macrotrends and mesotrends

Schematic overview of ecological macrotrends and mesotrends

1. **Rise of sustainable entrepreneurship** (Ch. 6.1)  
Growing importance of eco-responsible waste management
2. **Expanding of infrastructure with alternative transport systems** (Ch. 6.2)  
The Infrastructure is expanding, technically, legally and socially
3. **Growing shortage of commodities** (Ch. 6.3)  
Fossil fuels, certain metals and minerals will become more scarce and therefore more expensive in the coming years
4. **Food safety** (Ch. 6.4)
  - 4.1 Growing interest in food safety and quality
  - 4.2 Use of biotechnology
5. **The Netherlands' position and infrastructure** (H6.5)  
Due to its position and traffic infrastructure, the Netherlands has become the gateway to Europe
6. **Animal welfare** (H6.6)  
The growing importance of animal welfare
7. **Climate change** (H6.7)  
The drop in biodiversity

## 6.1 Rise of sustainable entrepreneurship

There is a noticeable trend towards more sustainable entrepreneurship, including the environmentally conscious use of commodities and the human-friendly and animal-friendly organization of manufacturing processes (De Korte et al., 2003).

### 6.1.1 Growing importance of eco-responsible waste management

Enforcers are of the opinion that the environment and waste branches should receive more attention. The more money spent in this branch as a result of public interest and political priorities, the greater the chances of fraud become, and putting prices on waste disposal on

the supply side of domestic and industrial waste makes evasion of regulations more attractive. More waste is produced each year, of which approximately two-thirds consists of packaging waste and, accordingly, the European Commission has drawn up a directive on Packaging and Packaging Waste. This directive has been converted into national legislation by all member states (interview with the SIOD).

The growing interest in eco-responsible waste disposal is a crime-stimulating factor. A lucrative symbiotic market for clandestine waste disposal is emerging.

## **6.2 Expanding infrastructure with alternative transport systems**

The space necessary for infrastructure up to the year 2030 will be between 35,000 and 60,000 hectares. This depends on the economic growth and the growth of the population. The main road network, the subsidiary road network and the adjustments to the railways are some of the structures demanding extra space. It is expected that the use of cars will continue to grow up to the year 2030 by more than 60 per cent. This rise will be mainly in the social-leisure traffic, though there will be a great increase in goods transport on the roads too. The increasing growth of mobility and its adverse effects on the environment ensure that the government increasingly often encourages the use or the construction of alternative means of transport (De Korte et al., 2003).

### **6.2.1 Infrastructure is expanding, technically, legally and socially**

Both private and public transport systems will undergo large changes in the coming years, for instance, there is the introduction of pay-

as-you-drive, the growing presence of ICT in transport chains, high-speed railways and underground transport systems for people and goods in urban areas. Technical and social safety is important factors for their reception and cost-effectiveness (Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2006).

The on-going expansion of the infrastructure entails more intensive and expensive surveillance for the mobile part of the population. This could result in evasive behaviour, with a market being created for alternative systems, evasive technology and counterfeits, making it a crime-stimulating factor.

## **6.3 Growing shortage of commodities**

The natural reserves of economically vital commodities, such as certain metals and minerals as well as fossil fuels, are in danger of becoming exhausted. As a result, there will be substantial price increases on the market for things like scrap metal. It will be more attractive to steal metal such as copper from cables and lightning conductors, and bronze from works of art. As soon as fuel becomes significantly more expensive, the readiness to steal it from storage reservoirs, petrol stations and individual vehicles will grow (Ministry of Defence/DCDC, 2007).

### **6.3.1 Fossil fuels, certain metals and minerals will become more scarce and therefore more expensive in the coming years**

The existing reserves of fossil fuels will be emptied in the coming decades; more expensive methods of mining will cause the market prices to rise considerably. Oil – besides being the most important fuel - is a raw material for very many petrochemical products such as synthetic materials. Drastic effects may be expected. Besides, the mining and processing of all sorts of metals, such as aluminium and

steel involve the consumption of large amounts of power. Higher fuel prices may have a cumulative effect on the economy. Alternatively, market mechanisms may provide room for new solutions for the created shortage. Copper, nickel and rarer metals such as cobalt will become scarcer. Because their use is indispensable for the manufacture of all sorts of electronics and in other manufacturing processes, it may influence all sectors of the economy. Alarming news concerning the scarcity of specific metals has caused significant fluctuations in the rates of exchange recently. Certain minerals will also become scarcer in the coming years. (Ministry of Defence/DCDC, 2007; Session with the DNR).

The great price increases for scarce goods are crime-stimulating factors. It is to be expected that there will be an increase in (large-scale) theft, illegal trade and clandestine markets as a result of the considerable price increases. A case in point are the on-going increases in fuel prices which will lead to fuel theft, fraud with bank cards and a lucrative trade in both on illegal markets. In addition, the large-scale theft of copper and other metals may lead to a disruption in the infrastructure (due to the theft of essential copper wiring).

## **6.4 Food safety**

The food scandals of the past decade, epidemics with fatal consequences for humans and animals as well as the increasing trend for a healthier life means that the demand for improved food safety has a growing impact on the agricultural industry. The same applies for the food industry, the pharmacy industry, the retail business and other sectors (interview with the Rathenau Institute).

### 6.4.1 Growing interest in food safety and quality

Due to the rise in prosperity, the quality of life and of the consumption has grown more important. Health has become a high priority. To an increasing extent, links are being laid between food and health. Higher and higher demands are being made on the quality of (animal) food products and the health risks are finding less acceptance. Consumers are not always consistent: besides the hypes concerning food scandals, a large majority of the population continues with eating patterns (a lot of fat and animal protein) that cannot really be regarded as healthy. Increased distance and time between production and consumption, global trade in commodities and products and food-engineering have made the food chain more obscure: “anonymization”. Viewed objectively, the safety of food has probably improved, but for the consumers, there is more uncertainty concerning the care for safety of the food, and as a consequence, there is a lack of trust. Incidents and suspected risks – especially when they are discussed in the media in great detail - have met with responses such as avoiding chicken, pork or beef. Transparency of chains, recognition of products and guaranteed quality is demanded. People are becoming increasingly worried about food safety. In animal products, this involves the fear of zoonoses (BSE), possible presence of veterinary medicines in products (antibiotics, hormones) and contaminations in fodder (dioxins). This fear has been around for some time now, but has grown because of the worrying news items in the media ([www.rlg.nl/adviezen/016/016\\_3\\_1.html](http://www.rlg.nl/adviezen/016/016_3_1.html)). The growing interest in food safety and quality is a crime-stimulating factor. Healthy and safely prepared food, such as organic products, commands a higher price, making fraud more attractive. Due to criminal trading, there could be contaminated products on the market.

### **6.4.2 Use of biotechnology**

The implementation of genetic manipulation and other forms of biotechnology are socially controversial, but still seem to gradually increase (Ministry of Defence/DCDC, 2007).

This crime-stimulating factor is an extension of the growing interest in food safety and quality. The opportunity and possibility for cheating consumers will rise if the guardianship is insufficiently effective.

## **6.5 The Netherlands' position and infrastructure**

Due to the Netherlands' position on the North Sea and its infrastructure, as well as its relatively large fleet for the goods transport sector, it is an attractive transit country.

### **6.5.1 Due to its position and traffic infrastructure, the Netherlands is the gateway to Europe**

The Dutch economy is largely based on transit. Transport is an important economic sector (KLPD / the DNRI, 2004).

The Netherlands' attractive position and its good infrastructure that should improve over the coming years as a result of market developments and government policy are a crime-stimulating factor.

## **6.6 Animal welfare**

Consumers are placing more and more value on animal welfare. This is due to a love of animals, but also stems from concern about

food safety. Some people see the treatment animals receive as symptomatic of the troubles of the whole society. Animal welfare has already become an issue in parliamentary politics.

### **6.6.1 The growing importance of animal welfare**

Consumers are setting increasingly more store by the animal-friendly production of (meat) products. This is expressed in trends such as “love of animals” and “animal friendliness” and can partly be explained by the increasing “individualization” of society. Family ties are disappearing or losing their importance, and in their stead, the ties with our pets and other animals are becoming stronger. Another explanation can be sought in the increased prosperity: in Northwest Europe, all essential necessities of life have been met, and are available in abundance. As a consequence, there is now time (and money) left to worry about animals. The growing societal concern for animal welfare has led to the fact that animal welfare has been given a high place on the agendas of the government and the European Union. The rise of the Party for the Animals in parliament fits this trend. In the future, there will be more stringent basic requirements to be met for animal welfare. This may have consequences for the market, with much higher prices for meat products, etc. Politicians will also have to pay more attention to other abusive situations such a breeders of pets, where criminals are systematically at work (interview with the Dutch Association of Insurers; [www.rlg.nl/adviezen/016/016\\_3\\_1.html](http://www.rlg.nl/adviezen/016/016_3_1.html)).

The growing interest in animal welfare is a crime-stimulating factor. The growing attention has an effect on the intensification of inspections and guardianship. A larger, and therefore a market that is more attractive to fraudsters will emerge for animal-friendly meat.

## 6.7 Climate change

Recent authoritative reports from the *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (IPCC) sponsored by the United Nations indicate that the climate on earth will change drastically in the coming decades, effected by human activities. These changes include significant rises in temperature and a higher sea level. There will also be consequences for the bio-diversity and the availability of drinking water. The adverse effects of the proclaimed climate change will manifest particularly in tropical and subtropical regions. However, some changes will occur in the Netherlands too, and the climate changes in the rest of Europe and the rest of the world will have consequences for Dutch society, for instance, as more people become refugees and more armed conflicts arise. The British Ministry of Defence regards climate change as one of the three most important strategic issues for the next thirty years. For the NDB, is equally as important that, although these effects will be drastic, they will only have a substantial impact in ten or twenty years' time, or perhaps even later (interview with the Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Defence/DCDC, 2007; [www.ipcc.ch](http://www.ipcc.ch)).

### 6.7.1 The drop in biodiversity

As more and more species of animals and plants become scarce or are even threatened with extinction, their value increases. Protected mammals, birds and reptiles will be more attractive for trading or smuggling. The endangered fish sorts may be politically and legally protected, they are also the target of illegal fishing operations. Activists can count on a greater support; their actions may become more militant and directed against companies that are regarded as threats to these vulnerable species (interview with the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defence/DCDC, 2007; [www.ipcc.ch](http://www.ipcc.ch)).

The reduced biodiversity is a crime-stimulating factor. A growing

trade in rare species of animals and plants is emerging. Clandestine border-crossing markets for endangered species may emerge and expand. This may have an impact of potential perpetrators, victims and guardianship.



# 7 Demographic macrotrends and mesotrends

Schematic overview of demographic macrotrends and mesotrends

1. ***Immigration and sections of the population in the Netherlands*** (H7.1)  
The increasing diversity of the Dutch population  
Integration is slow to develop  
Immigration policy, increasingly vulnerable position of illegal immigrants  
The problems surrounding immigration from Eastern Europe
2. ***Level of education*** (H7.2)  
Reduction in the number of drop-outs  
The deprivation of schools in urban areas  
Shortage of qualified workers  
Women have a proportionally larger share in the education market
3. ***The composition of the population and urbanization*** (H7.3)  
Increase in enclave formation  
On-going urbanization: fall in spending power  
The Netherlands will start to suffer from contractions in its economy around 2030 due to a shrinkage of the population
4. ***Migration*** (H7.4)  
Poverty in the Third World is hardly alleviated
5. ***Composition of the population*** (H7.5)  
The Netherlands is ageing: the number of (potential) victims is rising  
A rise in single households and single-parent families

## 7.1 Immigration and sections of the population in the Netherlands

The Netherlands is an immigration country, and it is an established fact that recently immigrated sections of the population have a relatively high rate of birth. However, there are signs that emigration among the native Dutch is rising. Besides, relatively many families from the middle-income bracket are leaving the cities to settle elsewhere in the Netherlands. A consequence of these factors is that the composition of the population will be subject to drastic changes in the coming years, particularly in the cities. Simultaneously, segregation and the formation of enclaves seem to be in process; the trend watcher Adjiedj Bakas has even mentioned “tribalization” of the Netherlands in this connection, referring to the reflective perspective of protected gated communities for the wealthy.

The proportion of city dwellers who do not originally come from the Netherlands will rise substantially, so that the majority of the population in certain districts will consist of immigrants and foreign nationals and their children (Bakas, 2005; the DNRI, 2005; De Korte et al., 2003; Dexter, 2006; Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2006; interviews with the Verwey-Jonker Institute, the AIVD, and the University of Wageningen).

### **7.1.1 The increasing diversity of the Dutch population**

In 2006, the Netherlands had approximately 1.7 million non-Western immigrants and foreign nationals, who lived mainly in the larger towns and cities. The position of the Netherlands as a country of immigration indicates a persistent flow of new arrivals who each bring their own cultures and traditions with them. Dutch society has become very culturally diverse in a very short time. A district like the Pijp in Amsterdam has inhabitants from over a hundred different nations, who often retain their own nationality. Added to the large categories of migrants from the former colonies and from Mediterranean countries who are familiar to us by now, there are new migrants from fairly unknown source countries. Some of these migrants are internal migrants from within Europe coming to the Netherlands. The Internet makes it easier to keep in touch than used to be the case, so the ties with the country of origin remain close. The number of non-Western migrants and foreign nationals will rise by 1.1 million to 2.8 million between now and 2050. The number of children of second-generation migrants hardly differs from that of native Dutch women. Considering the relatively large size of migrant families and the immigration to the Netherlands that is expected to remain constant, this development will remain significant in the coming years (The KLPD/the DNRI 2006; the Ministry of Defence/DCDC 2007; Van Nimwegen & Esveldt, 2006; interviews with the NIDI, the SIOD and the Ministry of Justice).

The increase in diversity in the Netherlands will affect the social cohesion and feelings of security. The increase in diversity may be a crime-stimulating factor in the sense that it will be more difficult to design an unambiguous (government) policy. Due to the unfamiliarity with these new groups, there is (still) relatively little known in the investigation and collecting relevant investigation information requires a relatively great effort and expense. Among the immigrants are persons from countries with weak government traditions and from dictatorships who manage to illegally acquire a substantial income. To do this, they primarily use contacts from their own countries and fellow countrymen in the diasporas elsewhere in Europe. Because of the increasing use of the Internet to maintain contact with their countries of origin, the necessity to integrate diminishes even further and the formation of factions increases.

### **7.1.2 Integration is slow**

Minorities in the Netherlands speak Dutch more and more often and have more and more contact with Dutch people. In itself, this is indicative of growing integration. However, the number of actual visits paid by one group to the other has dropped during the last decade. Marriages between sections of the population are still quite rare. The fact that integration is slow to develop can be blamed on immigration and segregation. Too many Muslims find it hard to identify with “the Dutch”; they are bound by the Islam. The contrasts between groups with a specific cultural or religious identity are growing while the groups themselves are becoming closer and more tightly knit. Migrants attach great value to the retention of their cultural identity but this ambition is not often supported by native Dutch. The Dutch often have a distorted view of the migrants’ cultural notions. A case in point is that migrants have different opinions among themselves about the ideal neighbourhood, the best school, the immigration policy, the respect for their own religion and

the importance of the integration exam (*inburgering*). The attitudes towards immigrants have become more inflexible (the SCP, 2004, 2006; Fortuin & Van der Graaf, 2006; *Integratiemonitor gemeente Amsterdam*; interviews with the Verwey-Jonker Institute and the Ministry of Justice).

The depth of contrasts and chasms between (cultural) groups is growing, which may influence the “us and them” mentality, polarization and feelings of insecurity in society. Stereotypes and society’s inflexibility may stimulate and justify crimes such as internal violence, robberies, sexual offences, etc.

### **7.1.3 Immigration policy: increasingly vulnerable position of illegal immigrants**

The influxes of immigration are influenced by relatively autonomous circumstances and events, such as natural disasters and armed conflicts. However, the adopted immigration policy and how it is perceived by interested potential migrants also has some influence. A policy that leaves room for illegal residence by large numbers of asylum-seeking migrants could involve the risk of crime: recent research proves that approximately ten per cent of the asylum-seeking migrants who are residing here illegally are suspected of criminal activities, although not enough is known about their participation in organized forms of crime. The pressure of migration on Europe remains great; illegal immigration will increase due to the “oyster effect”: more restrictive EU immigration policy. The more difficult legal entrance becomes, the more attractive illegal entrance becomes. Illegal migrants have to stay out of sight of increasingly stringent surveillance systems and become more vulnerable to organized crime, which will respond to their position (Althoff en De Haan, 2006; interview with the NIDI).

The residence of illegally residing asylum-seeking migrants in

the Netherlands is a crime-stimulating factor. On the one hand, it is because this group can become involved in crime, and on the other, because they form a vulnerable group and can easily become victims of organized crime. As a result of the more stringent laws and regulations, organized crime can make more and more money from and by means of illegal migrants.

#### **7.1.4 The problems surrounding immigration from Eastern Europe**

The borders of the European Union are permeable, just like any other border, but the extent in which they permeable varies from West to East and from North to South, and the consequences of this permeability are just as varied. Eastern Europe has a tradition of border-crossing despite measures taken in a European Union context. White Russians, for example, come from a completely different society than ours, i.e. a dictatorship, and this deserves our attention. In this respect, the Balkan region also remains significant. (interview with the NIDI).

The influx from Eastern Europe is a crime-stimulating factor. As a result of the growing immigration, new (and “old”) forms of crime may emerge and/or return. And as the (trade) contacts with Eastern Europe are easy to maintain, via the roads, railways, air traffic and waterways, it is a crime-stimulating factor for illegal trade routes. More attention should be paid to new groups, as Europe and the Netherlands, considering the standards of wealth, are very attractive for (illegal) residence.

## **7.2 Level of education**

The standard of education of the Dutch population has risen substantially over the past decades and is still rising. A greater increase in the level of education is expected to take place in the coming years; after 2010, the division of the levels of education will remain more or less stable. (De Korte et al., 2003).

### **7.2.1 Reduction in the number of drop-outs**

The number of school leavers without certificates is disturbingly high particularly among migrant sections of the population. However, the efforts to reduce the numbers of school leavers who have no form of basic qualifications seem to be achieving some success. More than ever before, people who left school prematurely are returning to get some qualifications (De Korte et al., 2003).

Getting qualifications (from school) is a crime-inhibiting factor. People in possession of school certificates have more career options and usually choose other careers than ones in crime.

### **7.2.2 The deprivation of schools in urban areas**

Half of all primary school pupils in the cities are included in the policy for combating educational disadvantages. One in three primary schools in the urban areas is a school with a high proportion of ethnic minority pupils (>80% non-Western migrant pupils). The learning achievements of the attendants remain considerably inadequate as a result of the composition of the pupil population (Van Nimwegen & Esveldt (2006).

It is a crime-stimulating factor: because of their disadvantages in education, there is an increased risk of dropping out of school and/or not obtaining a school certificate (or certificate from further education). Studying people who do not have any (school) qualifica-

tions is a good method for predicating who will commit crimes and/or become involved in crime.

### **7.2.3 Shortage of qualified workers**

The pace in which the population is growing will decrease until a maximum of approximately 17 million is reached around 2030-2035. Some European countries are already contracting; it is foreseeable that, in the near future, there will be international competition for the well-educated middle class. In Eastern European countries such as Poland, they are experiencing a relatively high (seasonal) migration to the west of Europe, and as a result, Polish entrepreneurs are mainly recruiting their workforce from Asia. (Interview with the NIDI).

The contrast between people who have little education and those who are highly qualified is becoming larger and larger. As a result of the shortage of well-educated employees, the labour and seasonal migration will continue to grow. The migration of qualified employees will lead to a drop in prosperity and agricultural areas will become depopulated, forming –indirectly- a crime-stimulating factor. The receiving land may also experience more problems related to crime, including alcohol and drugs-related crimes, problems concerning the upbringing of children who have entered the country as part of the family reunification policy and issues surrounding less prosperous relatives, if the immigrants do not manage to integrate properly.

### **7.2.4 Women have a proportionately larger share in the education market**

Compared to men, women are better educated and have a lower dropout rate (Groen & Kranenberg, 2006).

A higher standard of education may, as part of a wider emancipation, have both an inhibiting and a stimulating effect on criminal

involvement. As yet, women still have a relatively small share in criminal markets, but they could also use their better education and ensuing assertiveness to gain better positions in those markets and accordingly play a more important role as regards (organized) crime.

### **7.3 Composition of the population and urbanization**

The Netherlands needs more space; not only for living and working, but also for sports and leisure. The rise in population will continue into the coming years: according to recent population predictions by Statistics Netherlands, the limit will be reached around 2030 at 17 million inhabitants. Expectations are that the population will not grow any larger after that, because the positive migration balance (the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants) will no longer be able to compensate the excess of births over deaths and consequently the rise in population will change to a drop (Dexter 2006; <http://statline.cbs.nl>).

#### **7.3.1 Increase in enclave formation**

Concentrations of underprivileged migrants are developing in the problem areas of the larger towns and cities. There appears to be a development in which a proportionally large number of inhabitants who have the same ethnic, non-Dutch background are living in certain urban districts. This is obstructing their integration and may even lead to the formation of enclaves and to segregation (interviews with the NIDI, the Verwey-Jonker Institute, the AIVD, the SIOD and the Ministry of Justice).

As a result of the increasing segregation, the contrasts between various sections of the population are growing larger. There is a risk

of cultural sub-economies with their own rules (not paying taxes, for instance). This is a crime-stimulating factor.

### **7.3.2 On-going urbanization: fall in spending power**

The four major cities in the Netherlands are expected to maintain the same number of inhabitants as they have now (although Utrecht may grow substantially as the “vinex” housing estate “Leidsche Rijn” develops), but the proportion of municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants will rise considerably. However, the metropolitan areas will lose spending power: annually, Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Utrecht will lose tens of millions of euros in annual income as people leave these cities. In particular, native Dutch families with young children are leaving the urban areas en masse. Rotterdam will suffer the greatest loss, but Amsterdam and The Hague will still manage to attract people from the professional classes (Van Nimwegen & Esveldt, 2006).

The situation as outlined above will lead to more individualization and anonymity, and less cohesion and social control. The departure of qualified and highly qualified people from the cities will involve the risk of concentrations of poverty and deprivation. As a consequence, cross-generational deviant opportunity structures will emerge and continue to exist. This is a crime-stimulating factor.

### **7.3.3 The Netherlands will start to suffer from contractions in its economy around 2030 due to a shrinkage of the population**

The size of the population is expected to start showing a falling trend in approximately 25 years time. This will influence the economic growth adversely, and will have large consequences for the labour market, the number of houses standing empty, the depopulation of districts and housing estates, for facilities and security, etc. This

effect will be noticeable in peripheral parts of the country during the next decade (interviews with the NIDI and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations).

If the prosperity in a contracting economy starts to drop, potential perpetrators may become motivated as a result of deprivation.

If depopulation occurs, the social cohesion will deteriorate, and with it, the informal social control. Both are crime-stimulating factors, but without any substantial effect during the coming decade.

## **7.4 Migration**

Migration remains a determining factor as regards population pressure. With the current pressure on the outer borders of Europe, it could happen that the influx of illegally residing non-Dutch, especially from the poorest regions of the world, including Africa, will continue to grow if no drastic measures are taken. The British Ministry of Defence has warned that far-reaching measures are needed to protect the stability of Europe against the pressure of migration from Africa. The existence of illegal migrants will be marginalized even further as the acquisition of useable identity papers becomes more difficult and biometric identification more widespread, as a result of which they will be more easily identifiable as illegal aliens. In addition, considerable rises in regular migration of job-seekers, etc. from the East European EU states are also expected (Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen 2006; Ministry of Defence/DCDC 2007; interview with the NIDI).

### **7.4.1 Poverty in the Third World is hardly alleviated**

Developing countries remain poor; there is only a marginal change in the globally unequal division of wealth. 2.5 billion people (40% of the world population) live on less than two dollars a day. From

an international perspective, the differences in income between poor and wealthy countries remain the same: in 1975, the difference between these categories was 14 times; in 2004, it was 13 times. The world population of 6.54 billion in 2006 is growing by 1,14%. Worldwide, poverty remains the largest push factor for migration. The British Ministry of Defence regards “global inequality” as one of the three most significant strategic issues for the next thirty years (Ministry of Defence/DCDC 2007; GAO 2007).

The contrasts between rich and poor will always exist. As a consequence of the increasing awareness (via the Internet, for instance), the contrast can be visualized and becomes more obvious, and this applies to the deprived sections of the population in the Netherlands as well, which in itself may have an alienating and therefore crime-stimulating effect. People from poor countries will increasingly attempt to reduce the differences, for instance, by evading the (immigration) laws and by illegal residence.

## **7.5 Composition of the population**

The composition of the population will change drastically in the coming period, partly due to ageing; other forms of cohabitation than family units and migration patterns. According to some people, the Netherlands may become a “sleeper nation”: rich, but lethargic and vulnerable. The ageing is already noticeable; until the year 2020, the number of 12 to 25-year-olds will remain more or less constant, which limits its relevance for the Dutch National Threat Assessment of 2008 as yet (Van Nimwegen & Esveldt 2006; Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands 2004).

### **7.5.1 The Netherlands is ageing: the number of (potential) victims is rising**

The children of the baby boom that took place after WWII will reach pensionable age around 2010; from then onwards, the pace of the ageing will accelerate until 2050, when approximately a quarter of the population will be older than 65. Already, the majority of baby boomers are no longer participating in the labour process, but have ample leisure time. A substantial portion of this category have quite extensive financial resources, as a result of good pensions, early-retirement procedures and/or possession of an almost mortgage-free house and/or the profits of its sale. Older single people are more active and prosperous, more socially active – and go out more in the evening, and could consequently become vulnerable. Senior citizens are relatively often victims of fraudsters who approach them either in person or by sending accept giro forms for “charities”, etc (Van Nimwegen & Esveldt 2006; Klapwijk and Van Rij 2005; SCP 2004; Session with the DNRI).

Wealthy elderly people are increasingly becoming a potential risk group for victimhood, which produces a crime-stimulating factor.

### **7.5.2 More single households and single-parent families**

In 2005, the Netherlands had 2.5 million single households; the predictions for 2035 are 3.5 million. In 2005, there were 444,000 single-parent families; the predictions for 2050: approximately 700,000. A protective effect is produced by good intergenerational contacts, i.e. family ties, which will disappear for an increasingly larger portion of the population. Life in a family unit also contributes to feeling secure. Society is becoming “security aware”, as a result of which, it is becoming more difficult for underprivileged, poorly educated criminals to acquire an illegal income. There are several important factors in this respect. A case in point is the situation of

the households: it is assumed that family households are, on average, better protected than other forms because the residents are home more often, and the social control surrounding a single household is less (Van Nimwegen & Esveldt 2006; The SCP 2004; interview with the NIDI).

Single households and one-parent families are increasingly becoming a potential risk group for victimhood, but also produce increasingly more perpetrators. The social control is deteriorating (even further). All this may be regarded as a crime-stimulating factor.



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# Respondents

Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst (General Intelligence and Security Service)

Autoriteit Financiële Markten

The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations

Ministerie van Justitie (Ministry of Justice)

Nederlands Interdisciplinair Demografisch Instituut (Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute)

Rathenau Instituut

Sociale Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst ((social Intelligence and Investigation Service)

the University of Wageningen

Verbond voor Verzekeraars (Dutch Association of Insurers)

Verwey-Jonker Instituut

VNO-NCW (Netherlands Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers)

Two group sessions with a total of approximately 20 staff from the Netherlands Police Agency/ National Crime Squad and the Netherlands Police Agency/National Criminal Intelligence Department



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